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Abstract
Robert Cover’s argument in Nomos and Narrative applies to a system of municipal law (that of
the U.S.A.). This article seeks to demonstrate that Cover’s claims concerning nomoi and narratives
have relevance to relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union (a non-municipal
context, in which the concept of supranationalism figures prominently). While making this move
from a municipal to a non-municipal setting, central strands in Cover’s argument are explained
or developed by reference to the literary theory of Mikhail Bakhtin, communitarian political phi-
losophy, and the writings of Isaiah Berlin and Joseph Raz on value incommensurability. Along
with Cover, these writers are used to analyse a clash between a narrative of redemption (associated
with the pursuit of European integration) and British narratives of insularity (which run on, among
other things, the themes of independence and sovereignty). This essay concludes by identifying
these two types of narratives as standing in a relationship of ineliminable tension.
∗Thanks are due to John Alder, Thom Brooks, David Campbell, Emilios Christodoulidis, John
Gillingham, Peter Jones, and Ian Ward for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
Thanks are also due to Ann Sinclair for her assistance with research and to those who commented
on the three papers out of which this essay grew. Two of these papers were given in Newcastle Law
School (one in 2004 and one in 2005) and the third was given in Newcastle University’s Politics
Department in 2005.
In Nomos and Narrative Robert Cover’s focus is local.  He concentrates his 
attention on relations between the U.S. federation (a “civil” or “imperial” 
community) and some of the religious communities (“padeic” communities) 
whose respective forms of life U.S. law accommodates and seeks to protect.1 He 
dwells at length on the crises of obligation that those embedded, at once, within a 
religious community and the U.S. federation may experience.2 Nowhere does he 
discuss the often tense relations between the European Union (E.U.) and the 
United Kingdom (U.K.).3 Nonetheless, his essay speaks powerfully to this often 
tense relationship.4 The central purpose of this discussion is to explain why this is 
so.  As we will see, Cover’s arguments afford means by which to gain 
considerable analytic purchase on E.U.-U.K. relations and, among other things, 
the crises of obligation to which they give rise.  But this does not mean that 
Nomos and Narrative can be used in tick-box fashion: i.e., as a readily applicable 
checklist of considerations relevant to the relationship between the E.U. and U.K.  
Rather, when applied to E.U.-U.K. relations, Cover’s arguments are richly 
suggestive.  And, in order, to make use of these arguments, we must make an 
analogical leap from relations within a system of municipal law to relations within 
the E.U.’s sui generis legal order.5 This leap seems justified for three reasons.  
First, in the examples given by Cover and in relations between the U.K. and the 
 
1 R.M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13-14 (1983) (where 
“world-maintaining” “civil” or “imperial” communities are identified as enforcing universal norms 
and “padeic” communities are identified as “world-creating” systems of meaning that are typically 
sustained by means other than the imposition of force).  As used in the text, ‘form of life’ refers to 
those practices, institutions, values, and ideals that shape particular communities and cultures.  See 
A.C. Grayling, WITTGENSTEIN: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 79 and 97 (1988). 
2 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 27-28. 
3 The various institutions that have, since the early 1950s, been established to advance the agenda 
of European integration have been given a variety of names, some very specific (e.g., the 
European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.)), and others more general (e.g., the European 
Economic Community (E.E.C.), the European Community (E.C.) and the European Union (E.U.)).  
Each of these names is used at appropriate points in the text.   For ease of reference, the general 
term ‘Europe’ is also employed in this essay to refer to those institutions in which the project of 
integration has found expression. 
4 See I. Ward, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LAW 45-46 (2003, 2nd edn.) 
(where “the often tense relationship” between Europe and its member-states is described as 
“defin[ing] the European experience”). 
5 The sui generis character of the E.U.’s legal order arises, inter alia, from the use within it of 
supranational and intergovernmental institutions and practices.  See J. Shaw, Europe’s 
Constitutional Future, PUBLIC LAW 132, 133 (2005) (describing the European Union as “some 
sort of ambiguous non-state polity”).  (The characterisation of the E.U. as a “sui generis” legal 
order is not, without considerable elaboration, very illuminating.  And, even when this effort is 
made, the results are controversial and not in all respects satisfactory.  See N. Krisch, Europe’s 
Constitutional Monstrosity, 25 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 320, 321, et seq 
(2005).) 
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E.U., the operations of the law mean that a smaller and threatened group must 
interact with a larger and threatening collectivity.  Second, in both the small 
communities examined by Cover and in the case of the U.K., community-
members make defensive responses to the situation they face.  These responses 
involve invocation by community-members of narratives that sustain the 
normative world within which they live.6 Third, in both Cover’s examples and in 
E.U.-U.K. relations, the larger collectivity wishes to secure the allegiance of the 
smaller group by presenting itself as a context in which the latter can expect to 
flourish. 
 
To make full use of Cover’s arguments, we will have to supplement them in three 
ways.  To this end, this essay draws on three bodies of writing.  First, the literary 
theory of Mikhail Bakhtin, which examines, inter alia, monologic and dialogic 
models of interaction and social ordering.  Second, communitarian political 
philosophy, which, among other things, points up intersubjective sources of value, 
meaning, and identity.  Third, the political philosophy of Isaiah Berlin and Joseph 
Raz, who pursue the theme that the values that invest our lives with meaning are 
often incommensurable.  But before supplementing Cover in these ways and 
turning our attention to U.K.-E.U. relations, we must examine in some detail the 
argument advanced in Nomos and Narrative.
Cover on Nomos and Narrative 
 
Robert Cover presents a picture of nomos (normative world) and narrative as 
necessarily related.  For the normative worlds (or nomoi) we inhabit owe their 
distinctive shape to the narratives that invest them with meaning.7 This means 
that, as narratives change, so too do the normative worlds they sustain.8 But 
 
6 Cf Z. Bauman, IDENTITY: CONVERSATIONS WITH BENEDETTO VECCHI 76 (2004) 
(where responses of the sort noted in the text are associated with the invocation of “identity: in a 
defensive war” against a larger and “threatening” group). 
7 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 4 (on nomoi as normative universes), and at 31 (on the nomoi-
shaping power of narrative).  In assuming that the activities of a collectivity are the source of 
practically significant understandings (values, ideals, and other norms), Cover’s thinking bears 
similarities to that of communitarian political philosophers.  See, for example, A. MacIntyre, A 
SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS: A HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY FROM THE 
HOMERIC AGE TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1 (1998, 2nd edn) (arguing, inter alia, that 
“moral concepts change as social life changes”). 
8 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 31 and at 34.  Cover’s understanding of the term ‘nomos’ differs 
significantly from that in, for example, F.A. Hayek, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, 
POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 79 (1978) (where a nomos is 
defined as an “abstract rule due not to anybody’s concrete will, applicable in particular cases 
irrespective of the consequences, a law which could be ‘found’ and was not made for particular 
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while the shape of a particular nomos may alter over time, it retains one abiding 
feature.  As a socially constructed reality, a nomos depends on “normative force” 
for its existence.9 According to Cover, narrative (the encoding of commitment) is 
the most obvious manifestation of this force.10 And when this force finds 
expression in the institution of law, it underwrites a set of practices that work to 
sustain a particular normative world.     
 
On Cover’s account, judges seek to defend the legal nomoi within which they 
work.  Hence, they may identify as unacceptable those interpretations and 
narratives that threaten to compromise the integrity of the normative world within 
which they adjudicate.11 Cover develops this point by introducing the idea of 
“jurisgenesis.”12 By jurisgenesis, he means “the creation of legal meaning.”13 He 
also emphasises that a “multiplicity” of meanings often – indeed, typically - 
emerge within systems of law.14 Consequently, judges have to respond to the 
problem of “too much law.”15 Here, their task is “jurispathic”: they have to 
identify some meanings as lying outside the bounds of the nomos they seek to 
sustain.16 Moreover, when a judge makes such a determination, she forcefully 
rehearses a narrative that is often the prelude to the infliction of violence (in the 
form of a coercive sanction) on those whose views she has rejected. 17 
Cover plainly intends this analysis to have broad application.  But, for the most 
part, he uses U.S. constitutional law to illustrate particular points.  The U.S. 
constitution (in common with other nomoi) is itself both a repository of richly 
elaborated and “essentially contested” narrative meaning and an instrument of 
 
foreseeable purposes”: e.g., common law norms, understood as the fruit of continuous and 
spontaneous processes of adaptation). 
9 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 10. 
10 Id. (on narrative as a world-sustaining “normative force”) and at 29 (on narratives as “encodings 
of commitment”).  (Cover’s use of the term “force” in this context is apt.  For, to the extent that a 
narrative works to sustain a nomos, it is a perlocutionary speech-act: i.e., a means by which to 
exert social control through, among other things, persuasion.  On perlocutionary speech-acts, see 
J.L. Austin, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 99 and 101-102 (1976, 2nd edn), and S. Fish, 
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF 
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES ch. 20 and ch. 21 (1989).)   
11 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 40-46. 
12 Id. at 11, et seq.
13 Id. at 11. 
14 Id. at 19. 
15 Id. at 42. 
16 Id.
17 Id. at 40. 
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social control.18 Moreover, the constitution works to accommodate (or host) a 
plurality of other nomoi.19 Cover illustrates this point by reference to a range of 
religious groups (who provide clear examples of padeic – or world-creating - 
communities) and U.S. states whose forms of life have assumed distinct shapes.20 
Those who cleave, for example, to the Amish, Mennonite, and Shaker faiths have 
been allowed to “carve[ ] out” spaces (sustained by law).21 And, within these 
spaces, they have been able to develop the narratives that invest their lives with 
meaning.  
 
In his discussion of the U.S. constitution and the nomoi it hosts, Cover points up 
the sometimes acute tensions that exist between normative worlds.  Relevant here 
is the general point that narratives proceed from distinct “starting points” and give 
expression to a distinctive set of normative commitments (or “identifications”).22 
Thus, those who embrace a “statist” (here, federal) view of the U.S. constitution 
draw on a narrative that privileges the values most closely associated with the 
project inaugurated with the founding.23 These values are, on their view, the stuff 
of an “epic” or “myth” in light of which they understand the operations of the law 
and the (plural) community (of communities) it works to sustain.24 By contrast, 
those who, for example, cleave to the Amish faith see its sacred texts as the 
(equally epic) core of their normative universe.25 This being so, “we cannot 
 
18 Id. at 17 (arguing that the meaning of all “authoritative precepts” is “essentially contested” (i.e., 
open to, and often the subject of, a range of plausible, and sometimes widely divergent, 
interpretations)).  While Cover characterises (nomos-generating) authoritative precepts as open to 
a range of plausible interpretations, he argues that each such interpretation claims for itself a final, 
authoritative status.  Thus it would seem to be informed by the intention of establishing a form of 
social ordering described below as “monologic.” 
19 Id. 30 (on the (U.S.) state as a “political host”). 
20 The-individual-state-of-the-Union as a nomos is plainly not Cover’s central concern.  This is 
hardly surprising.  For he argues that “by the mid-twentieth century the states had lost their 
character as political communities.”  See id. at 48-49.  Cover does, however, identify a range of 
race-related issues as implicating the-state-as-nomos.  See id. at 53-54, n. 145 (on Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 119 (1857) (on the constitutionality of slavery in the slave-holding states) and at 
58, n. 159 (on Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (on the Virginia miscegenation statute). 
21 Id. at 30. 
22 Id. at 33.  
23 Id. at 33.  (For discussion of the historical roots of the “statist” view referred to in the text, see 
S.P. Huntington, WHO ARE WE?  AMERICA’S GREAT DEBATE 59 (2004) (arguing that “a 
mainstream Anglo-Protestant culture” was, until late in the twentieth century, generally assumed 
to provide a context within which a range of “subcultures” were accommodated).) 
24 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 4 (claiming that, for “every” constitution, there is an epic) and at 
25 and 33 (on the relevance of myth to “constitutional meaning”).   
25 Id. at 32-33. 
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pretend to a unitary law”: i.e., a law that has the same degree of (more or less 
privileged) practical significance for all its addressees.26 
As Cover’s discussion of the relationship between the U.S. constitution and the 
Amish, Mennonite, and other communities makes plain, tension exists even in 
circumstances where the law’s addressees value the manner in which it operates.  
But this tension is more acute in circumstances where those who attach privileged 
significance to, say, a sacred text see the law not as a refuge but as a bridgehead.  
For, in cases of this latter sort, they seek to do rather more than go about their 
business in a “dedicated ... space” or a “nomic refuge.”27 Rather, they wish to 
move beyond the confines of their own (limited) domain and to inscribe their 
agenda on the normative world (the constitutional framework) that lies beyond its 
confines.  Moreover, to act on such a wish may be to compromise the law’s 
effectiveness as a mechanism that serves to sustain order.  But not to act on such a 
wish may be to break faith with the sacred texts that shape the relevant nomos.  
These are circumstances in which a “crisis of obligation” may, on Cover’s 
analysis, arise.28 
As well as drawing attention to this source of tension, Cover also examines the 
question of institutional design to which it gives rise: “How might we fashion a 
legal framework that, at once, promotes order and hosts a plurality of nomoi?”  In 
his response to this question, Cover draws, once again, on U.S. law.  He identifies 
the nomoi accommodated within the U.S. legal system as being sustained in a 
wide variety of ways.  One of the more obvious is the constitutional commitment 
to the free exercise of religion.29 In this safeguard of religious liberty, we find a 
“wall” that has long sustained, inter alia, the Amish, Mennonite, and Shaker 
communities in the U.S.A.30 And just as the constitutional commitment to 
religious liberty can work to protect “an insulated nomic reserve,” so too can, 
inter alia, property law and corporation law.31 
But, whatever the means used to accommodate nomoi, tension persists between 
them and the legal system that hosts them.  For the narratives that invest nomoi 
 
26 Id. at 33. 
27 Id. at 30. 
28 Id. at 27-28. 
29 Id. at 27. 
30 Id. at 31.  See also at 61 (where Cover illustrates the point noted in the text by reference to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that application of 
Wisconsin’s compulsory high school attendance law to Amish children violated their parents’ 
rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause)).  
31 Id. at 30-31. 
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with meaning make “self-referential” claims to supremacy.32 These claims 
establish a binary opposition in which the nomos they underwrite assumes a 
privileged status, while the practical world beyond has a secondary status.33 Thus 
it is that, for example, members of the Mennonite community and “statist” 
officials inhabit significantly different practical worlds.  For each disprivileges the 
practical agenda of the other.34 This is why tension is ineliminable.  But this is 
not, as Cover recognises, an insuperable barrier to productive practical relations 
between those who inhabit the relevant worlds.  However, in his discussion of 
U.S. law, Cover points up the sometimes acute difficulties involved in 
establishing such relations.  His starting point is the (deontological) assumption 
that nomoi (at least, presumptively) merit “respect,” “autonomy,” and 
“toleration.”35 But against this (normatively appealing) assumption he sets the 
institutional context established by the U.S. federation.  Within this framework, 
judges wrestle with two competing impulses.  They seek to treat particular nomoi 
with respect (by, inter alia, applying a “principle of deference” to the states).36 
But, on occasion, they may conclude that constitutional or other legal norms 
provide grounds on which to alter the “boundaries” that mark the outer limits of a 
particular nomos.37 Thus, judges are torn between narratives of insularity (that 
caution them against trampling upon particular forms of life) and narratives of 
redemption (that encourage them to save the inhabitants of particular nomoi from 
other community members or from themselves).38 
On Cover’s analysis, both narratives of insularity and narratives of redemption 
yield bodies of (ever-changing) “law.”39 Here, Cover uses ‘law’ in a wide sense.  
Rather than referring simply to positive legal norms, it embraces all the normative 
impulses, ideals, and visions that shape a particular nomos - be it that of a 
 
32 Id. at 30. 
33 Id. at 60.  (The work done by “binary opposition” in the text is much like that in deconstructive 
thought.  As used by deconstructionists, a binary opposition exists where one value stands in a 
hierarchically superior and tense relationship with another (competing) value.  See J.M. Balkin, 
Being Just with Deconstruction, 3 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 393, 394-395 (1994).  See also 
J. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990).)  
34 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 26-28. 
35 Id. at 34 (on respect and autonomy) and at 60 (on toleration).  (Deontological moral theories 
specify that actors should do those things that are assumed to have intrinsic value.  Moreover, 
actors are enjoined to disregard (at least some of) the negative consequences that flow from acting 
in ways that are assumed to have intrinsic value.  See T. Honderich (ed.), THE OXFORD 
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 187-188 (1995).  See also T. Nagel, Justice and Nature, 17 
OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES  303, 304 (1997).)  
36 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 56-57. 
37 Id. at 33. 
38 Id. at 52-63 (on the two types of narrative described in the text). 
39 Id. at 40. 
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religious community, a state, or the U.S. federation.40 But while Cover uses ‘law’ 
in this wide sense, he recognises that judges typically do not.  For they usually 
succumb to a “hermeneutic of jurisdiction.”41 In other words, judges can be 
expected to fashion norms that give effect to the purposes of the system within 
which they perform their adjudicative role.  In plain terms, “[j]udges are people of 
violence.”42 For, in circumstances where the practical agenda of another world 
clashes with that of the world in whose name they adjudicate, they are likely to 
privilege the latter. 
 
Having now pointed up the main features of Cover’s argument in Nomos and 
Narrative, we must supplement it in the ways outlined in the Introduction. 
 
Cover and Bakhtin 
Many of the points made in Nomos and Narrative sound a note that is strongly 
reminiscent of the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin.43 Cover writes of 
nomoi (within the U.S. legal system) that speak to the same practical concerns 
(e.g., religious belief and educational opportunities) in sometimes widely 
divergent terms.44 In his response to (essentially) the same issue, Bakhtin takes a 
broadly similar tack.45 He presents an account of practical life as the event of co-
 
40 ‘Law’ in Cover’s wide sense bears similarities to the concept of Sittlichkeit (or ethical 
community) as it features in the political philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel.  See F. Beiser, HEGEL 234 
(2005) (where Sittlichkeit (ethical community) is identified as embracing “the manners, morals, 
and whole way of life of a nation or people”). 
41 Id. at 56.  (Rather than talking in terms of a “hermeneutic of jurisdiction”, Cover might (more 
charitably) have used the idea of the law’s “internal point of view” to capture the practical outlook 
of judges.  See H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 57, 86, and 201 (1994, 2nd edn) (where the 
point of view internal to a system of law is identified as finding expression in the adoption of a 
“critical reflective” standpoint, from which certain modes of behaviour are classified as “right” 
and others are categorised as “wrong”).) 
42 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 53. 
43 Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) and a group of colleagues (who became known as the Bakhtin 
Circle), sought to theorise the Russian Revolution and its degeneration into dictatorship under 
Stalin.  Later in his career (and having been sent into internal exile), Bakhtin advanced a theory of 
the novel as a heteroglossia (or plurality of voices).  Thereafter, he wrote on, inter alia, the 
carnivalesque works of, inter alios, Rabelais.  For a succinct account of Bakhtin’s work, see, C. 
Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle, THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,  
http://www.iep.utm.edu/b/bakhtin.html 
44 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 61 (noting divergent understandings of the significance properly to 
be attached to religious beliefs and educational opportunities in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972)). 
45 Bakhtin’s concerns and those of Cover are essentially the same for this reason.  In each case, 
they posit standpoints or frames of reference from which individuals and/or groups make different 
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being (sobytie sobytiya).46 Central to this event are a range of discourses that 
offer distinct positions on the approach that ought to be taken to practical 
questions.  Moreover, both Cover and Bakhtin see the distinct positions they 
describe as functions of perspective.  Cover tells us that the narratives that shape a 
particular nomos proceed from a distinct starting point.47 Bakhtin makes much 
the same point when he talks of a “law of placement.”  By this he means that our 
utterances inevitably proceed from distinct standpoints.48 And with the 
perspectivalism of both Cover and Bakhtin comes a relativity of value.  For 
Bakhtin, stories told from a particular standpoint are (for those inhabiting that 
standpoint) the source of a coherent set of values.49 While, for Cover, narratives 
(proceeding from distinct standpoints) work to “objectify” values.50 
To these points of intersection between Cover’s thinking and that of Bakhtin may 
be added one more that is of the first importance to this discussion.  It concerns 
the epic narrative form.  On Cover’s account, the narratives that shape nomoi are 
epics.51 Moreover, these narratives stand in relations of acute tension with one 
another in circumstances where they speak to the same practical concerns.  
Tension arises because such narratives state reasons for rejecting the practical 
agenda set out in other narratives that speak to the same concerns.  Cover 
identifies this sort of tension as necessarily connected with the institution of law.  
For “[t]he worlds of law we create are all, in part, redemptive”: i.e., they seek to 
order (and thereby redeem) the world beyond their present limits.52 
In Bakhtin, we find an analysis of the epic form that provides a basis on which to 
explain in more detail why these tensions arise.  Bakhtin identifies the epic as 
 
(and often antagonistic) judgments about the same objects (behaviour, practices, goods, and 
institutions). 
46 M. Holquist, DIALOGISM: BAKHTIN AND HIS WORLD 41 (1990). 
47 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 33.  
48 M. Holquist, supra note 46, at 44.  (While the views of Bakhtin and Cover are, for the reasons 
given in the text, broadly similar, a significant point of difference merits mention.  The “starting 
points” described by Cover are intersubjective: i.e., the normative commitments of a particular 
community.  By Contrast, Bakhtin invokes the “law of placement” in the course of explaining the 
uniqueness of the individual’s perspective.  Bakhtin’s emphasis on the perspective of the 
individual does not, however, preclude the application of the “law” he describes to collectivities 
who share and value a common life.) 
49 Id. at 37. 
50 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 45 (arguing that “narrative is the literary genre for the 
objectification of value”).  See also at 44 (where Cover notes “the absence of a single, ‘objective’ 
interpretation”). 
51 Id. at 4. 
52 Id. at 61. 
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monologic.53 By this, he means that the epic presents us with an “absolute” or 
totalising discourse: i.e., a discourse that seeks to present final and authoritative 
answers to practical questions.54 In pointing up the monologic (and totalising) 
character of the epic form, Bakhtin makes plain the source of the tension to which 
Cover refers.  For when monologic discourses collide, the problem of 
uncombinability arises.55 To accept the self-referential supremacy claims made 
by, say, discourse A, we must reject those set out in discourse B.56 Small wonder, 
then, that in such circumstances crises of obligation are apt to arise. 
 
We see the practical impact of epic (and monologic) discourse in institutions, 
social formations, and movements that have sought to inscribe their practical 
agenda on all available space.  Consider “official discourse.”57 In its more 
extreme forms, this sort of discourse “resists communication.”58 This is because 
those to whom such discourse is addressed are expected to embrace the world-
view to which it gives expression.59 Thus, official discourse makes no concession 
to otherness.60 The example of the Soviet Union serves to illustrate these points.  
The contours of the Soviet world were supposed to be captured by an official 
discourse of egalitarianism and material progress.  One manifestation of this 
 
53 M. Bakhtin, Epic and Novel, in M. Holquist, ed., THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR 
ESSAYS BY M.M. BAKHTIN 17 (1981). 
54 Id.   See also M. Holquist, supra note 46, at 77.  On totalising forms of discourse, see J. 
Hawthorn, A CONCISE GLOSSARY OF CONTEMPORARY LITERARY THEORY 217 (1994, 
2nd edn).  (In his account of monologic discourses, Bakhtin pursues a theme that runs through his 
writing.  This theme is the tension between forces and institutions that tend towards hierarchy and 
the reduction of human life to a stultifying pattern and forces and institutions that are receptive to 
diversity.  This tension is, for example, prominent in Bakhtin’s account of the carnivalesque.  In 
this connection, Bakhtin draws a distinction between, inter alia, the classical body and the 
grotesque body.  The classical body is a rounded, finished and perfect artefact.  By contrast, the 
grotesque body is a thing of buds and sprouts, and thus tells the story of human becoming (without 
completion).  Moreover, Bakhtin identifies becoming (as celebrated in carnivalesque writing) as 
an ineliminable and valuable feature of the human condition.  See S. Dentith, BAKHTINIAN 
THOUGHT: AN INTRODUCTORY READER ch. 3 (1995).) 
55 On uncombinability, see J. Gray, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
301 (1993). 
56 While acceptance of discourse A may preclude acceptance of discourse B (due to 
uncombinability), we may decide to accept A as authoritative in some spheres and B as 
authoritative in others.  Moreover, to the extent that A gains ground at the expense of B, the 
conflict between the two discourses is zero-sum in character.  (On zero-sum conflict, see R. 
Scruton, A DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 592 (1996,. 2nd edn) (noting that the idea 
of zero-sum conflict is taken from game theory and refers to situations where one player’s gain is 
(necessarily) another’s loss).) 
57 M. Holquist, supra note 46, at 52. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (arguing that “[o]fficial discourse is autism for the masses”). 
60 Id.
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discourse was socialist realism, which claimed to depict (in works of art) the lives 
of those who lived under Soviet rule.61 But, far from reflecting the reality of life 
in the U.S.S.R., socialist realism posited as normative both a community and its 
constituent members.  Thus, it operated (to use Stalin’s phrase) as “an engineer of 
human souls” and provided an example of the epic at is most stultifying.62 
While Bakhtin’s reflections on the epic form are bleak, his view of history is not.  
For history, on Bakhtin’s account, is a contest between monologic and dialogic 
approaches to practical life.63 Those who embrace epics, and act on the reasons 
for action they provide, seek to advance their distinctive agenda as far as they 
possibly can.  But their efforts are in vain.  For, monologism is, according to 
Bakhtin, a theoretical and practical impossibility.64 This is because the law of 
placement (as earlier described) means pluralism is an inescapable fact of 
practical life.  And this fact, on one interpretation, means that Bakhtin sets out a 
“historical masterplot” in which “a deluded perception of unity” gives way to 
“knowledge of ever-increasing difference and variety that cannot be overcome in 
any unifying synthesis.”65 Certainly, Bakhtin argues for a dialogic approach to 
social ordering that better reflects humankind’s (necessarily) plural condition.  
Moreover, he identifies the literary form of the novel as going some way towards 
instantiating his favoured approach to practical life.  According to Bakhtin, 
relations between the plurality of voices (or “heteroglossia”) that find expression 
in a novel are complex.66 Each voice exerts a centrifugal force.67 By this he 
means that the various voices threaten to destabilise the complex whole of which 
they form a part.  But a countervailing centripetal force offsets the tendency 
towards destabilisation.  This latter force finds expression in a readiness on the 
part of those who speak from a distinct standpoint to recognise (and 
accommodate) the claims of others.68 Thus, the novel is, on a Bakhtinian view, “a 
supremely democratic, anti-totalitarian literary form.”69 
61 L. Kolakowski, MAIN CURRENTS OF MARXISM: ITS ORIGINS, GROWTH, AND 
DISSOLUTION, Vol. III, THE BREAKDOWN 292-297 (1978). 
62 M. Holquist, supra note 46, at 52.  Stalin’s statement concerning socialist realism is recorded in 
J.A. Cuddon, A DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS 636 (1977).  See also M. Kundera, THE 
UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 250 (1985) (arguing that official Soviet discourse and 
socialist realism provided examples of “totalitarian kitsch” by, inter alia, falsely representing the 
U.S.S.R. as a “smiling brotherhood”). 
63 M. Holquist, supra note 46, at 75. 
64 Id, at 53.   
65 Id. at 76.  See also C. Taylor, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 32-33 (1992) (on the 
“fundamentally dialogical character” of “human life”). 
66 Id. at 69-78. 
67 Id. at 72. 
68 D. Lodge, THE ART OF FICTION 129 (1992). 
69 Id. See also M. Holquist, supra note 46, at 52.  Cf M. Kundera, THE ART OF THE NOVEL 14 
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Bakhtin and Cover plainly share a commitment to frameworks within which a 
plurality of identities can co-exist.  There are, however, differences of emphasis.  
Cover emphasises the concept of community.  For the framework within which 
padeic communities are accommodated is itself characterised as a “civil” or 
“imperial” community.  But Bakhtin’s heteroglossia suggests a (more modest) 
model of association closer to a modus vivendi (a way of living or working 
arrangement between parties who do not share strong affective bonds).70 But, 
while this difference in emphasis exists, both Bakhtin and Cover are pluralists.  
Moreover, Cover’s pluralism bears resemblances to that of a number of 
contemporary communitarian political philosophers, to whom we now turn.   
 
Cover and Communitarianism71 
On Cover’s analysis, the nomos to which the individual gives allegiance shapes 
his or her identity.72 And, this being so, the individual “knows how to live” in 
the “community of meaning” of which he or she is a part.73 For he or she is the 
bearer of its “life-vision.”74 The position thus staked out by Cover has a 
significant corollary.  To destroy or undermine the integrity of a nomos is to 
undercut one of the major constituents of personal identity.  Hence, courses of 
action that threaten to destroy or undermine the integrity of a nomos are morally 
problematic. 
 
These strands of Cover’s argument are strongly reminiscent of the communitarian 
political philosophy that has loomed to prominence in the years since Nomos and 
Narrative first appeared.  Communitarian political philosophers subscribe, inter 
alia, to the embeddedness thesis, which points up a significant connection 
 
(1988, L. Asher, trans.) (arguing (without reference to Bakhtin) that ‘”t]he world of one single 
Truth and the relatively ambiguous world of the novel are molded of entirely different 
substances”). 
70 For more detailed discussion concerning the concept of a modus vivendi, see J. Rawls, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 147 (1993) and S. Mulhall and A. Swift, LIBERALS AND 
COMMUNITARIANS 187-189 (1992).  See also the distinction between community and modus 
vivendi drawn in J. Gray, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM ch. 1 (2002). 
71 Cover does not anticipate contemporary communitarianism: his essay appears after the 
publication of A. MacIntyre, AFTER VIRTUE (1981, 2nd edn.) and M. Sandel, LIBERALISM 
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982), and in the same year as M. Walzer, SPHERES OF 
JUSTICE: A DEFENCE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). 
72 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 28. 
73 Id. at  6. 
74 Id. at 32. 
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between context (community) and identity and self-understanding.75 Thus we 
find Michael Sandel stating that people “conceive their identity … as defined to 
some extent by the community of which they are a part.”76 And the communities 
in question take a wide variety of forms.  This point is driven home by Alasdair 
MacIntyre in his observation that: “we all approach our circumstances as bearers 
of a particular social identity….  I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation.”77 
The embeddedness thesis sets out in a crisp form of words an important 
component in Cover’s argument.  The communitarians perform a similar service 
with respect to another strand of Cover’s argument.  Cover, as earlier noted, 
argues that significant loss attends the destruction of a nomos, and so we should 
not lightly embark on such a course of action.  This is an issue to which Michael 
Walzer speaks.  People are, on Walzer’s account, “culture producing creatures” 
who “make and inhabit meaningful worlds.”78 This being so, “we do justice to 
actual men and women by respecting their particular [cultural] creations,” 
including distinct (local) understandings of justice.79 Walzer is ready to qualify 
this strongly relativist statement of principle where, inter alia, slavery and/or 
 
75 See S. Caney, Liberalism and Communitarianism: a Misconceived Debate, 40 POLITICAL 
STUDIES 273 (1992).  See also J. Gray, supra note 55, at 8-9 (on “the moral and political 
importance of collective identification – the pervasive human phenomenon in virtue of which 
personal identities are constituted by membership in some nation, religion, tribe, or other 
collectivity”).  (On some analyses, the embeddedness thesis gives expression to a strong form of 
relativism, according to which “men wholly bound by tradition or culture” inevitably regard “other 
outlooks or ideals” as “strange” or “unintelligible.”   See I. Berlin, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF 
HUMANITY: CHAPTERS ON THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 82 (2003).  Berlin is, however, 
adamant that value incommensurability does not support the strong relativist position he describes.  
See id. at 80 and infra note 81 (on incommensurability).  See also K. Popper, THE MYTH OF 
THE FRAMEWORK: IN DEFENCE OF SCIENCE AND RATIONALITY ch. 2 (1994) 
(criticising strong forms of relativism on the ground that they (wrongly) endorse “the myth of the 
framework”, according to which a particular view of the world is an “intellectual prison” from 
which escape is impossible).  The positions staked out by Berlin and Popper are supported by the 
analysis of U.K.-E.U. relations offered in this essay.  For, as examples drawn from British political 
history will make clear, embeddedness does not (necessarily) blind people to the attractions of 
normative worlds other than their own.  Rather, it may render them (sometimes deeply) uneasy 
about embracing the values, ideals, etc., that shape other nomoi).) 
76 M. Sandel. supra note 71, at 150. 
77 A. MacIntyre, supra note 71, at 220. 
78 M. Walzer, supra note 71, at 314. 
79 Id. (In staking out the position noted in the text, Walzer brings into sharper focus than Cover 
two deontological assumptions that the two seem to share: (i) the creative processes that find 
expression in distinct cultures are intrinsically valuable and (ii) treating those who engage in such 
activity with respect is the intrinsically right thing to do.  On the deontological strand in Cover’s 
thinking, see supra note 35 (and associated text).) 
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genocide become part of the fabric of a distinct form of life.80 But, even with this 
qualification in place, a strong presumption in favour of respect for distinct 
cultures (or normative universes) remains a requirement of justice.  Here, Walzer 
spells out in emphatic terms the approach to practical life that informs Cover’s 
thinking in Nomos and Narrative.
Neither Walzer nor the other communitarian thinkers we have drawn on add much 
in the way of substance to Cover’s argument.  But in reducing some of his central 
points to their essentials, they help us to grasp the practical significance of 
Cover’s argument in Nomos and Narrative. We now turn to an issue that Cover 
does not bring into clear view.  This is value incommensurability and the 
problems to which it gives rise.  Here, the writings of Isaiah Berlin and Joseph 
Raz afford means with which to make good something of a blind spot in Cover’s 
thinking. 
 
Cover, Berlin and Raz 
The problem of value incommensurability arises where it is impossible to rank 
two or more values on a common scale or by reference to an overarching value.81 
Prominent in Berlin’s discussion of incommensurability is the controversial 
ontological assumption that the values in question are objective.82 On the basis 
that this assumption is sound, individuals and groups can flourish in a variety of 
rationally defensible ways.83 This being so, Berlin argues that the commonly 
encountered readiness to found institutions on a single value constitutes a 
practical menace.  For it encourages the impression (indeed, may even encode the 
message) that the relevant value has a status superior to all others.  And, when this 
impression hardens into a practical postulate, the upshot may be (to recur to the 
language of Bakhtin) a strong form of monologic social systematisation.  
Practices, institutions, and other values become means by which to pursue the 
single, overarching value.84 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Berlin’s writings on incommensurability is 
the ultimately positive (perhaps even celebratory) response he makes to an issue 
 
80 M. Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: a Response to Four Critics, 9 PHILOSOPHY AND 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 209, 210-212 (1980).  
81 I. Berlin, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 170 (1969). 
82 I. Berlin, supra note 75, at 79. 
83 Id. at 11. 
84 I. Berlin, supra note 81, at 118 (arguing that “[w]here ends are agreed, the only questions left 
are those of means”). 
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many commentators characterise as a problem.85 For the (assumed) fact of value 
pluralism makes it possible (as we have noted) for humankind to explore its 
potentialities in a range of defensible ways.  For Berlin, this is no theoretical 
matter.  He finds in the practical life of actually-existing communities, 
expressions of commitment to the incommensurable values he describes.86 And 
this, he explains, is why we find particular societies pursuing (strongly thematic) 
forms of common life that resist ranking.87 Berlin’s interest in 
incommensurability extends, however, beyond differences between communities.  
He also dwells at length on the choices made between incommensurables within 
particular communities.  Here, he identifies the history of the relevant community 
as an acceptable guide to action.  This is because the option that “least obstructs” 
the common life of a particular community may quite properly be embraced.88 
Moreover, in staking out this pluralist position, Berlin’s political philosophy 
clearly has affinities with that of Cover. 
 
Cover’s thinking also has affinities with that of Joseph Raz.  For Cover exhibits 
sensitivity to an issue examined in Raz’s writings on incommensurability.  In 
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, Raz offers an account of “constitutive 
incommensurabilities.”89 Raz states that “if A and B are incomparable options of 
this [constitutive] kind then if an agent is in a situation in which A is his and B 
can be obtained by forgoing A he will normally refuse to do so.”90 He adds that, 
where constitutive incommensurables are in play, “[a]gents tend to remain in the 
position they [are] in.”91 Thus they exhibit a tendency towards conservatism.92 
And this tendency may go a long way towards explaining the attitudes that Raz 
 
85 See I. Berlin, supra note 75, at 56-57 (criticising Aristotle for his failure to “celebrate” cultural 
differences).  While positive in his response to the (assumed) fact of (objective) value pluralism, 
Berlin recognises that, in some circumstances, individuals and collectivities have to make “tragic 
choices.”  This is because certain values (and the institutions, practices, etc., they underwrite) are 
uncombinable.  See I. Berlin, supra note 81, at li.  See also G. Crowder, ISAIAH BERLIN: 
LIBERTY AND PLURALISM 74  (2004).   
86 I. Berlin, supra note 75, at 55. 
87 Id. at 65 and at 58-59 (where Berlin invokes Sir Walter Scott in support of the proposition that 
societies (like individuals) may present “fully realised characters”).  See also I. Berlin, FREEDOM 
AND ITS BETRAYAL: SIX ENEMIES OF HUMAN LIBERTY 77-78 (2003, H. Hardy (ed.)).  
88 I. Berlin, supra note 81, at 17-18. 
89 J. Raz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 345-353 (1986). 
90 Id. at 346 (emphasis added).  (Those who have to choose between constitutive 
incommensurables also face a problem of uncombinability.  I am indebted to Peter Jones for this 
point.) 
91 Id. (emphasis added).  
92 See A. Giddens, BEYOND LEFT AND RIGHT: THE FUTURE OF RADICAL POLITICS 45 
(1994) (discussing the conservative view that the past (and the institutions and commitments 
associated with it) should exert a significant influence over practical life in the present). 
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associates with constitutive incommensurabilities.  He states that “it is typical, 
where options of this kind are involved, for agents to regard the very thought that 
they may be comparable in value as abhorrent.”93 However, this is not to say that 
the “barrier to exchange” constituted by such values is “absolute.”94 But, in 
circumstances where A is traded off against B, this is typically experienced as 
involving “a heavy price.”95 Moreover, a readiness to pay such a price is usually 
associated by those who have hitherto embraced such a value as “inconsistent 
with a proper appreciation” of its significance.96 This being so, Raz states that, in 
the case of constitutive incommensurabilities, “failure of commensurability is a 
success.”97 By this, he means not simply that a refusal to rank A by reference to 
B is properly to appreciate the former.  He also sees such a refusal as an 
expression of “commitment” or “loyalty” to A.98 This is a topic to which Cover 
speaks (albeit, not in the language of incommensurability).99 For he states that 
commitment sustains a nomos and invests it with its distinctive (and often 
enduring) meaning.100 Nonetheless, he describes the sometimes “overriding 
temptation” to concede the state’s principal claim to interpretative authority.101 
Moreover, he states that, in circumstances where we make this concession, we 
have allowed our nomos (hitherto the centre of our normative world) to assume 
(i.e., to be ranked as having) a “secondary” status.102 
We have now supplemented Cover’s thinking in the ways indicated in the 
Introduction.  But before turning to the history of the E.U. and the history of 
 
93 J. Raz, supra note 89, at 346.  
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 348. 
97 Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
98 Id.
99 While Cover does not raise the issue of incommensurability in terms, he comes very close to 
doing so.  See R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 53 (emphasis added): “[j]ust as living in the economic 
world entails an understanding of price, so living in the normative world entails an understanding 
of the measures of commitment to norms in the face of contrary commitments of others.”  
100 Id. at 9 and at 39 (on “committed community”).  On Cover’s view, the members of particular 
communities are the authors of the values that invest their lives with meaning.  Moreover, Cover 
closely associates the processes of authorship he describes with the emotional intensity that the 
members of a community bring to the task of sustaining their nomos.  This emphasis on emotional 
intensity is, as noted earlier, marked in the case of the padeic communities discussed by Cover.  
But Cover also states that a padeic practical outlook is necessary in order to make “continued 
normative activity [presumably in all its forms] possible”.  See id. at 12-14.  Cf the much more 
astringent view taken in J.R. Searle, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 23-26 and 
37-39 (1995) (where “collective intentionality” is identified as sufficient to sustain normative 
practices). 
101 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 52. 
102 Id.
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U.K.-E.U. relations, a methodological point must be made concerning these 
histories.  In each case, the approach adopted is one favoured by Cover.  It takes 
the form of “thick description.”103 This involves engaging in detail with the 
practical concerns, arguments, ideals, and narratives that shape particular contexts 
and invest them, and the lives of those within them, with significance.104 Thick 
description has a number of strengths when dealing with topics like the E.U. and 
U.K.-E.U. relations.  It can work to point up the great effort sometimes expended 
on ensuring that a particular context-relative and context-shaping narrative has a 
privileged status.  Likewise, it can work to point up the extent to which 
disagreement and consequent tension in a particular context makes it impossible 
to identify any particular narrative as having a dominant status.  
 
In what follows below, we will see that great effort has been poured into ensuring 
that a narrative of integration or ever closer union enjoys a privileged position in 
the E.U.  Moreover, this narrative is, to use Cover’s term, “redemptive.”105 Those 
who unfold it assume that benign purposes will be served by pursuing integration 
in the face of opposition from those who wish to preserve distinct forms of life at 
the level of the member-state.106 Matters are noticeably different when we 
examine British responses to Europe.  Here, we do not encounter a dominant 
narrative.  Rather, we find an array of positions, some pro-E.U., some anti-E.U., 
and some that are ambivalent.  But these contributions to debate share one feature.  
They assume that, in Britain, a form of life exists that merits respect and a 
significant measure of protection.  This being so, British discourse on U.K.-E.U. 
relations either gives expression to, or is informed by, a narrative that Cover 
would categorise as “insular.”107 For it refers to a form of life that is, or may be, 
under threat from an external force and that strives to sustain itself.108 
103 Id. at 5, n 7 (noting the “thick contextuality” of “all moral situations,” and citing C. Geertz, 
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973).  On “thick description,” see also C. Geertz, 
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983). 
104 In light of the points made in the text, thick description is plainly concerned with capturing the 
point of view internal to particular practices, institutions, and communities.  On the internal point 
of view, see H.L.A. Hart, supra note 41, at 57, 86, and 201.  See also J.M. Balkin, Understanding 
Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 
105, 110-111 (1993). 
105 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 63. 
106 The narrative of redemption that has driven forward the project of European integration is 
informed by ideals (e.g., “perpetual peace” and “cosmopolitan right”) that derive from the 
Enlightenment.  See I. Ward, supra note 4, at 2-3 (discussing the Kantian ideals here noted and 
their influence on the project of European integration).  See also R.M. Burns and H. Rayment-
Pickard, PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORY: FROM ENLIGHTENMENT TO POSTMODERNITY 
37 (2000) (on the redemptive character of Enlightenment thought).  
107 R.M. Cover, supra note 1, at 62. 
108 Id.at 25.  (In the British context, narratives of insularity have a very long history.  See, for 
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Europe and the Pursuit of Redemption109 
In the aftermath of World War II, the attractions of an enduring and prosperous 
peace were readily apparent to those living in Western Europe.110 With the aim of 
bringing Europe’s history of bloodletting to a close, the French Foreign Minister, 
Robert Schuman embraced the idea of European integration as propounded by 
Jean Monnet.111 To this end, Schuman proposed, in Le Plan Schuman (1950), 
that Franco-German steel production be placed under supranational control.112 
Schuman’s argument in support of this proposal was “redemptive” in Cover’s 
 
example, P. Ackroyd, ALBION: THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH IMAGINATION (2004).  
See, in particular, ch. 12 (identifying The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle as having encouraged a fierce 
sense of English nationalism), ch. 16 (identifying the legend of “the once and future” King Arthur 
as having fostered an enduring sense of Celtic and English national identity), and ch. 47 
(identifying the “empirical temper” of English and British philosophy (as developed by, inter 
alios, Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke) as significantly different from the abstract theorising associated 
with, inter alios, Descartes, Leibniz, and Hegel).  See also N. Davies, THE ISLANDS: A 
HISTORY 678 (1999) (describing British law as “a planet unto itself”).  It is not just Britons who 
pursue the theme of British (or English) insularity.  See, for example, G.W.F. Hegel, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 453-454 (1991, J. Sibtree (trans.)), M. Spiering, Why the British 
Are Not Europeans, 2 EUROPA, http://www.intellectbooks.com/europa/number5/spiering.htm,
M. Spiering, British Euroscepticism, 20 EUROPEAN STUDIES 127 (2004), and R. Kagan, 
PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 5 
(2003).) 
109 While the project of European integration is usually associated with a narrative of redemption, 
Europe’s history provides the basis for a narrative of insularity.  See J. Rifkin, THE EUROPEAN 
DREAM: HOW EUROPE’S VISION OF THE FUTURE IS QUIETLY ECLIPSING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 199 (2004) (noting that a shared Greco-Roman heritage, Christendom, and 
the eighteenth-century Enlightenment lead some to conclude that Turkey should not be allowed to 
accede to the European Union). 
110 N. Davies, EUROPE: A HISTORY 1057, et seq (1996).  See also N. Davies, supra note 108, at 
883. 
111 The idea of European integration as advocated by Monnet had been put forward in the 1920s 
in, for example, R. Coudenhove Kalergi, PAN EUROPA (1922).  See also A. Salter, THE 
UNITED STATES OF EUROPE 92 (1931) (arguing for a Europe in which national governments 
would be reduced to “the status of municipal authorities”).  Salter was a close friend of, and 
considerable influence upon, Monnet.  See C. Booker and R. North, THE GREAT DECEPTION: 
THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 58 (2003). 
112 In the European context, ‘supranationalism’ is used to describe, inter alia, a legal order in 
which “decisions [and other legal norms] … derive their binding force from the fact that they are 
taken by organs endowed with the appropriate powers by the [relevant] Treaties … and not 
because each decision has been individually agreed to by the Member-States.  See T.C. Hartley, 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 10 
(2003, 5th edn).  In the European context, advocacy of supranational practical arrangements has a 
long history.  See, for example, P.-J. Proudhon, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE (1863). 
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sense.  For he presented the supranational institution he proposed as a means by 
which to transcend the nation-state and make plain through “concrete 
achievements” the possibility of a peaceful and united Europe.113 And, in pursuit 
of this ultimate end-state, Schuman invited west European states other than 
France and Germany to participate in the proposed scheme.  The Schuman Plan 
prompted the first steps towards European integration.  For, in 1951, ministers 
representing Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, and Luxembourg signed 
the Treaty of Paris, which established the European Coal and Steel Community 
(E.C.S.C.).114 The E.C.S.C. came into operation in 1952 with the redemptive aim 
of providing “the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long 
divided by bloody conflicts.”115 
The new Community’s commitment to supranationalism found expression in a 
legislative and executive High Authority charged with the task of promoting 
common interests (and not the interests of particular member-states).  A 
commitment to federation also informed the E.C.S.C., and found expression in a 
democratic assembly and a European Court of Justice (E.C.J.).116 Recognising 
that the new Community must be practical, the E.C.S.C.’s architects also 
furnished it with an institution that was strongly intergovernmental.117 This was 
the Council of Ministers: a body consisting of ministers representing each of the 
member-states that works to harmonise their respective bodies of law.  The 
E.C.S.C. was, to be sure, an uneasy combination of supranational, proto-federal, 
and intergovernmental elements.  But the first president of the High Authority, 
Jean Monnet was quick to emphasise its redemptive mission.  When he addressed 
the first session of the E.C.S.C.’s Assembly, he told its members that they were 
taking part in “the first government of Europe.”118 
After an abortive attempt to establish a European Defence Community, the 
E.C.S.C.’s six member-states took a further step towards union by establishing the 
 
113 C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 50 (quoting from a radio broadcast made by 
Schuman on May 9 1950 (now commemorated as “Europe Day”)). 
114 I. Ward, supra note 4, at 14. 
115 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 18 April 1951), Preamble. 
116 J. Pinder, A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 9-10 (2001). 
117 ‘Intergovernmentalism’ refers to processes of legally-co-ordinated co-operation between 
sovereign states (and gives expression to the principle that no state should be bound to undertake a 
particular course of action in circumstances where it has not given its consent).  See T.C. Hartley, 
supra note 112, at 10.  
118 F. Duchéne, JEAN MONNET – THE FIRST STATESMAN OF INTERDEPENDENCE 235 
(1994).  See also J. Monnet, MEMOIRS 392 (1978) (stating that “[o]ur Community is not a coal 
and steel producers’ association”; rather, it is “the beginning of Europe”). 
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European Economic Community (E.E.C.).119 The Treaty of Rome (signed in 
1957, along with a further treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM)) established the E.E.C.  Again, the proponents of this 
institution offered a redemptive justification for its existence.  For this further step 
towards integration would, so the preamble to the Treaty declared, “strengthen the 
safeguards of peace and liberty.”120 And, again, concrete achievements were seen 
as the means by which to underscore the practicality and legitimacy of the project.  
To this end, internal barriers to trade (tariffs and quotas) would be removed so as 
to promote economic efficiency and growth.121 Moreover, the Community 
committed itself to a redistributive agenda.  At Italy’s request, a social fund was 
established, with the aim of “reducing differences in wealth existing between the 
various regions of the E.E.C.”122 Along with this intensification of the integration 
project came a more robust rhetoric.  For, while the E.C.S.C. Treaty spoke of the 
pursuit of a “broader and deeper [European] community”, the Treaty of Rome 
announced that “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” was the aim of 
those participating in the new Community.123 
In the 1960s, European integration was turned into an ever more obvious legal 
reality by the European Court of Justice.  The E.C.J. established the doctrine of 
direct effect.124 This doctrine specifies that where Community directives 
unequivocally confer rights on individuals, they can enforce them in their national 
courts (even where conflicting national legislation exists).125 Having fashioned 
this new doctrine, the Court enunciated the doctrine of the supremacy of 
Community law, declaring that “the Treaty [of Rome] carries with it a permanent 
 
119 On the failure to establish a European Defence Community (E.D.C.), see H. Young, THIS 
BLESSED PLOT: BRITAIN AND EUROPE FROM CHURCHILL TO BLAIR 74-77 (1998).  
The history of the planned E.D.C. points up the tension between supranationalism and the desire 
on the part of nation-states to secure their vital interests.  In 1952, the Benelux countries, France, 
and Germany signed a European Defence Treaty with the aim of establishing the E.D.C..  But in 
1954, a majority in the French National Assembly refused to ratify the Treaty (and celebrated their 
success by singing the Marseillaise).  See F. Duchéne, supra note 118, at 256.  (The reaction of 
Britain’s Conservative government to the idea of a European Defence Community was dismissive.  
The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, saw it as promising nothing more than a “sludgy 
amalgam.”   See A. Sked and C. Cook, POST-WAR BRITAIN: A POLITICAL HISTORY 112  
(1993, 4th edn).) 
120 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome, 25 March 1957), Preamble. 
121 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 61. 
122 Id. at 83-84.  
123 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 120, Preamble. 
124 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963] C.M.L.R. 105. 
125 A directive is a form of secondary legislation (the legal basis for which will be a higher-order 
treaty provision).  Directives are binding as to the result to be achieved.  But member-states may 
choose the form and methods by which to implement them.  See J. Pinder supra note 116, at 185. 
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limitation [by the member-states] of their sovereign rights.”126 In staking out this 
position, the E.C.J. rendered a decision that was, at once, jurisgenerative and 
jurispathic.  The Court created legal meaning by setting out the principle of the 
supremacy of European law (which had not been written into any of the relevant 
treaties).127 And, in doing, so, it performed a jurispathic function, by identifying 
the European Community’s member-states as non-sovereign in status.  In other 
words, the E.C.J. made the sort of “self-referential claim” to supremacy that 
Cover identifies as serving to underwrite a particular nomos.128 Here, we see the 
E.C.J. taking steps that Cover would characterise as redemptive.  For the Court 
trenches upon the normative world of the member-state in pursuit of an agenda 
(integration) that it assumes to be benign and legitimate.   
 
Alongside these developments, the E.E.C. successfully pursued its more concrete 
objectives.  Between 1958 and 1968, trade between member-states more than 
doubled.129 Moreover, the average rate of annual growth in the Community 
during the 1960s was 5%.130 This compared favourably with both the U.S.A. and 
the U.K.  These successes encouraged the proponents of integration to 
contemplate more steps towards union.  Thus, in 1970, the Warner Committee 
called for economic and monetary union.131 But the economic success of the 
1960s was not repeated in the 1970s.  Consequently, the E.E.C.’s claims to be a 
redemptive force were weakened as talk of “Euroscelerosis” gained currency.132 
Nonetheless, the aim of union remained firmly in view.  In 1975, Leo Tindemans 
 
126 Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L. [1964] E.C.R. 585, 594 (emphasis added).  (This development 
would have come as no surprise to Jean Monnet.  For, shortly after the publication of Le Plan 
Schuman in 1950, he stated that “there can be no Community except among nations which commit 
themselves to it with no limit and no looking back.”  See J. Monnet, supra note 118, at 326 
(emphasis added).) 
127 C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111 at 124 (where the authors examine the argument put 
forward by Jens-Peter Bonde (a Danish member of the European Parliament) in support of the 
conclusion that the decision in Costa was a “coup d’état” since those involved in drafting the 
Treaty of Rome had decided not to include within it a principle establishing the supremacy of 
Community law). 
128 See supra notes 32-34 (and associated text).  See also supra notes 12-17 (and associated text) 
(on jurisgenesis and the jurispathic function of courts). 
129 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 61. 
130 id. at 15. 
131 Report to the Council and the Commission on the Realisation By Stages of Economic and 
Monetary Union in the Community (THE WARNER REPORT), Council - Commission of the 
European Communities (1970), Supplement to Bulletin 11.  (Jean Monnet had seen monetary 
union as a means by which to advance the agenda of integration since the late 1950s.  In 1958, he 
stated that, ‘”v]ia money,” Europe could “become political in five years.”  See F. Duchéne, supra 
note 118 at 312.) 
132 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 62. 
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(the Belgian Prime Minister) published a report entitled The European Union.133 
He sought to breathe life into the narrative of redemption by characterising the 
process of integration as an “adventure.”134 Moreover, he called for a common 
economic and monetary policy, a common foreign policy, and a common defence 
policy.  Thus, he made it plain that “the construction of Europe” could not be 
achieved on an a la carte basis.  Rather, every member-state would have to work 
towards and ultimately participate in the same end-state.  In staking out these 
positions, Tindemans made clear his commitment to what is variously referred to 
as “functionalism,” “the Monnet method,” or engrenage. This method finds 
expression in a steady and relentless pressure to extend Europe’s supranational 
powers and, where successfully employed, points up the practical impact of a 
persuasive narrative of redemption.135 
By the time the Tindemans report was published, Denmark, Eire, and the United 
Kingdom had acceded to the E.E.C.136 Shortly after these states committed 
themselves to the project of integration, Jean Monnet further developed the 
narrative of redemption by outlining the structure for a “Provisional Government 
of Europe.”137 Monnet’s proposal won favour with France’s President Pompidou 
and Germany’s Chancellor Schmidt and issued, ultimately, in the creation of the 
European Council.138 This body is made up of heads of state or government and 
the President of the European Commission and meets regularly with the aim of 
determining how best to pursue Europe’s ends.139 Along with this development 
came others in the direction of integration.  The Community intensified its 
commitment to redistribution by establishing a European Regional Development 
Fund (E.R.D.F.).140 And the 1970s closed with a further step in the direction of 
union: direct elections to the European Parliament.141 
But, by the 1980s (and notwithstanding the accession of Greece to the 
Community), the movement towards union appeared to be running out of 
 
133 Bulletin of the European Communities, S/1-1976. 
134 Id. 
135 N. Davies, supra note 110, at 1083.  Cf I. Ward, supra note 4, at 272 (describing Europe’s 
method as “something which amounts to little more than bare incrementalism”) and J. Shaw, 
supra note 5, at 133 (describing the European Union as having developed incrementally “from a 
‘mere’ international organisation … to some sort of ambiguous non-state polity”). 
136 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 17, et seq. The states noted in the text acceded to the European 
Community in 1973. 
137 J. Monnet, supra note 118, at 503. 
138 C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 160-162. 
139 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 186-187. 
140 C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 160. 
141 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 177. 
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stream.142 In 1985, the incoming President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, 
sought to move the E.E.C. further towards union.143 To this end, he won, from 
member-states, support for the creation of a single market.144 In 1986, this 
commitment found expression in a new treaty, the Single European Act (S.E.A.) 
(which became effective in 1987).  The S.E.A.’s central purpose was to reduce 
non-tariff barriers to trade.  In this respect, it was successful and boosted the 
economies of the member-states.145 But Delors’ aims extended beyond trade 
liberalisation.  Article 1 of the S.E.A. made this clear.  For it declared that “[t]he 
European Communities … shall have as their objective to contribute together to 
making concrete progress towards European unity.”146 And, with the aim of 
pointing up the concrete progress being made by Europe, Delors sought to secure 
the interests of workers by broadening the E.E.C.’s hitherto limited social policy 
agenda.  He also won support for an extension in the range of circumstances 
where the procedure of qualified majority voting would apply.147 Moreover, 
Delors further developed the narrative of redemption by ensuring that the S.E.A.’s 
preamble contained the first formal Treaty-based commitment to “the progressive 
realisation of economic and monetary union.”148 
The successful implementation of the single market programme encouraged a 
further move towards union.  This took the form of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.  
This treaty was a “watershed.”149 For it was, formally, a treaty on “European 
Union” and thus a further development in the narrative of redemption.150 Some of 
the main themes in this narrative were set out in a statement issued by the 
European Council to mark the fact that the “European Community” would, from 
1st November 2003, be known as the “European Union.”: 
 
The citizens of Europe know that the Community has brought them an 
end to bloody wars, a higher level of prosperity and greater influence.  
 
142 Greece acceded to the E.E.C. in 1981.  See id. at 177. 
143 Id. at 22-23. 
144 The implementation of the single market programme coincided with the accession of Portugal 
and Spain to the European Community.  See id. at 177. 
145 Id. at 25. 
146 Single European Act (Luxembourg, 17 February 1986, and The Hague, 28 February 1986), 
Article 1. 
147 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 25. 
148 Single European Act, supra note 146, Preamble.  (Delors saw the commitment to economic and 
monetary union set out in the S.E.A. as a signpost to future development.  For he stated: “It’s like 
the story of Tom Thumb lost in the forest, who left white stones so he could be found.”  To this 
Delors added: “I put in white stones so we could find monetary union again.”  See C. Grant, 
DELORS – INSIDE THE HOUSE THAT JACQUES BUILT 74 (1994).) 
149 H. Young, supra note 119, at 388. 
150 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 7 February 1992). 
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They know that today, even more than yesterday, isolation and 
retrenchment are false solutions, always illusory and sometimes 
dangerous.151 
As with the S.E.A., the Maastricht Treaty yielded concrete evidence of the 
movement towards union.  The concept of Union citizenship made its first 
appearance.152 Institutionally, a “pillar” structure was established and worked to 
point up the extent to which Europe had interposed itself into the practical life of 
its member-states.  For the pillar structure comprised the old European 
Community (pillar one), a common foreign and security policy (pillar two), and a 
commitment to enhanced co-operation in the sphere of criminal justice and 
policing (pillar three).153 Other measures in the Treaty, likewise, revealed the 
extent to which Europe now impinged on practical affairs at the level of the 
member-state.  The Treaty provided for a unit of Union currency (the Euro) and a 
European Central Bank.154 Moreover, aspects of education, public health, and 
youth culture now fell within the E.U.’s remit.155 And, along with these 
developments, came a further extension in the use of qualified majority voting 
and a further enhancement in the European Parliament’s role.156 
In light of these developments, the narrative of redemption first unfolded in the 
early 1950s was clearly resonating powerfully 40 years later.  But it was not 
resonating with sufficient power to win the unqualified assent of all member-
states.  Denmark and the U.K. declined to participate in the Maastricht Treaty’s 
single currency provisions.157 The U.K. also opted out of the Social Chapter (a 
collection of protections for workers).158 Thus the speed at which member-states 
moved towards union began to vary.159 And alongside this development, a new 
discourse began to pose a challenge to the redemptive narrative of integration.  
This discourse ran on the theme that member-states could, quite legitimately, 
make only a qualified commitment to Europe.  Moreover, those who advanced 
views of this sort appealed, inter alia, to the vague notion of “variable geometry” 
 
151 European Council in Brussels, 29 October 1993. 
152 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 57. 
153 J. Shaw, supra note 5, at 139.  (Pillars two and three, as described in the text, were 
intergovernmental.  Thus they differed from pillar one, which was supranational.  As an ensemble, 
the pillar structure formed what was, from 1993 onwards, referred to as “the European Union.”) 
154 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 27. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 27-28. 
157 Id. at 29. 
158 Id.
159 See I. Ward, supra note 4, at 49 (and sources cited therein) (where it is suggested that the 
Maastricht Treaty “brought into question the limits of European integration”). 
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(la géométrie variable).  For they saw the concession it made to differentiated 
integration as affording a means by which to check the advance of an 
“overweening” Europe.160 And they took the same view of a principle that was 
much discussed, in the European Union context, in the early 1990s.  This is the 
subsidiarity principle.  Subsidiarity specifies that bodies with responsibilities for 
larger areas (here, the E.U.) should only perform functions that those in smaller 
areas within the larger whole (here, member-states or sub-national regions) cannot 
adequately undertake themselves.161 
But while the notion of variable geometry and the principle of subsidiarity gained 
currency in the 1990s, the project of integration continued.  For, in 1995, the E.U. 
expanded with the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden.162 And, two years 
later, the Amsterdam Treaty established a “closer co-operation procedure,” 
allowing those member-states who wish to do so to intensify their relations with 
one another (independent of other member-states).163 This green light to 
intensification of relations between member-states was accompanied by a further 
development in the narrative of integration.  For the Amsterdam Treaty set out a 
clear commitment to the protection of human rights in the Union.164 This 
commitment was rehearsed, in more emphatic terms, in both the Nice Treaty of 
2000 and in the E.U.’s Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2003.165 This latter 
instrument appeared in the Draft Treaty for a European Constitution (hereinafter, 
the Constitutional Treaty).166 As its name suggests, the Constitutional Treaty was 
supposed to mark a decisive moment in the European narrative of redemption.  
 
160 C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, 316, n. 29 (noting that John Major, when British 
Prime Minister, used the idea of “variable geometry” when describing his idea of a “Europe of 
overlapping circles,” in which different groups of nations would co-operate for different 
purposes).  (While the notion of variable geometry gained currency in the 1990s, the idea of 
differentiated integration can be traced back to the TINDEMANS REPORT (1976).  See H. 
Young, supra note 119, at 322.)  See also J. Paxman, THE ENGLISH: PORTRAIT OF A 
PEOPLE 15 and 141-142 (1998) (where the adjective “overweening” is used to capture anti-
European sentiments shared by Major and a significant number of his compatriots in the second 
half of the 1990s).) 
161 See J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 55-56, and C. Grant, supra note 148, at 217 (identifying 
subsidiarity as Europe’s (or, more particularly, Jacques Delors’) “big idea” for 1992).  See also C. 
Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 286 (noting that John Major “imagined” that subsidiarity 
would allow member-states to “reclaim power” from Europe). 
162 I. Ward, supra note 4, at 51. 
163 The Treaty of Amsterdam (2 October 1997).  See also J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 30. 
164 Id. at 58. 
165 Treaty of Nice (26 February 2001).  The Charter of Rights was proclaimed by the Nice 
European Council on 7 December 2000 (and is based on the Community Treaties, international 
Conventions (e.g., The European Convention on Human Rights (1950)), the 1989 European Social 
Charter, and the constitutional traditions common to member-states). 
166 The Constitutional Treaty was the fruit of a process of deliberation that began with the 
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A year after the publication of the Constitutional Treaty, the European narrative 
of redemption was resounding over new swathes of territory.  For 10 new states 
(including the Czech Republic, Poland, and the Slovak Republic) embraced the 
project of integration.167 But in 2005, the integration project suffered an 
unprecedented reverse: national electorates in France and Holland rejected the 
Constitutional Treaty in referendums on the question as to whether it should be 
ratified.168 Some commentators see this as marking the moment in Europe’s 
history when the drive towards “ever closer union” came to a halt and the need for 
“a new political narrative” arose.169 Whether this is in fact the case is a question 
that cannot be answered with any confidence at the moment.  Certainly, the 
narrative of redemption continues to be rehearsed.  Thus we find Ulrich Beck and 
Anthony Giddens (in the wake of the French and Dutch referendum results) 
pointing up Europe’s attractions: 
 
The European Union is the most original and successful experiment in 
political institution-building since the second world war.  It has 
reunited Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall….  Through its 
economic innovations, it has played a part in bringing prosperity to 
millions….  It has helped one of the very poorest countries in Europe, 
Ireland, to become one of the richest.  It has been instrumental in 
bringing democracy to Spain, Portugal and Greece, countries that had 
previously been dictatorships.170 
Convention on the Future of Europe (chaired by former French President ValTry Giscard 
d’Estaing) that was established by the Laeken Declaration of 2001.  The Convention’s conclusions 
were presented to the governments of the member-states at the European Council in Thessalonica, 
Greece, in July 2003.  Following a process of amendment involving the member-states,, those 
representing their respective countries signed a Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe in 
Rome on 29 October 2004.  See on these developments, N. MacCormick, WHO’S AFRAID OF A 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION? 8-11 (2005). 
167 The other states to accede to the European Union were Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Malta, and Slovenia. 
168 In order to become effective, each of the Union’s member-states must ratify the Constitutional 
Treaty.  See N. MacCormick, supra note 166, at 16. 
169 See, for example, S. Jenkins, The Peasants’ Revolt, THE SUNDAY TIMES. June 5, 2005, 1 
(News Review), and W. Ress Mogg, Break Out From Brussels, THE TIMES, June 6, 2005, 19. 
170 U. Beck and A. Giddens, Nationalism Has Now Become the Enemy of Europe’s Nations, THE 
GUARDIAN, October 4, 2005, 28.  (The plausibility of the claim that Europe has served to secure 
peace in post-war Europe is called into question in A. Moravcsik, Europe Without Illusions (2002) 
(paper presented at the Third Spaak Foundation-Harvard University Conference), 9-11 (drawing 
on R. Dahrendorf, From Europe to EUrope: A Story of Hope, Trial and Error (2004) (lecture, 
delivered at the Centre for European Studies, Harvard University).) 
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In light of the success story they unfold, Beck and Giddens conclude that 
“nationalist or isolationist thinking” could be the “worst enemy” of Britain and 
other E.U. member-states.171 This unalloyed enthusiasm for Europe is not, 
however, shared by Tony Blair’s administration.  Following the French ad Dutch 
referendum results, plans for a British plebiscite on the Constitutional Treaty have 
been shelved.  The purpose of the planned vote had been to ensure the legitimacy 
of entry into a set of practical arrangements that would have altered constitutional 
fundamentals in the U.K.  In making plans for a referendum, the Blair government 
recognised that U.K.-E.U. relations are, and always have been, uneasy.  But this 
uneasiness is nothing new.  For example, following their accession to the E.E.C. 
in 1973, the British held a referendum in 1975 to determine whether they should 
remain a member-state.172 By a two-to-one majority, they voted for Europe.173 
But in the years following this result, Britain rapidly earned a reputation as the 
Community’s awkward member.174 
The U.K. and the Temptations of Insularity175 
The British, as we will see, have often exhibited an ambivalent attitude towards 
the project of European integration.176 At times, however, Europe has appeared to 
provide the answer to at least some of their practical problems.  This was, for 
example, true in the 1960s, when Britain’s economy grew at a slower rate than 
that of Europe.177 But, at other times, integration has appeared to be a threat to 
Britain’s distinctive form of life.  From the loss of sovereignty to the loss of 
national symbols (like imperial weights and measures), British critics of 
 
171 U. Beck and A. Giddens, supra note 170, at 28. 
172 H. Young, supra note 119, at 288-296. 
173 Id. at 296. 
174 S. George, AN AWKWARD PARTNER – BRITAIN IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
108 (1990).  See also R. Dahrendorf, ON BRITAIN 145 (1982) (noting that “Britain is a reluctant 
European”). 
175 While British critics of European integration typically unfold narratives of insularity in the face 
of a perceived European threat, their country’s history takes, on some analyses, the form of a 
narrative of redemption.  See R. Colls, IDENTITY OF ENGLAND 28 and 69-70 (2002) (noting 
that the advance of England (at the expense of Ireland, Scotland, and Wales) was widely 
associated (in England, at least) with, inter alia, the benefits of  “British liberty”). 
176 A clear example of British ambivalence towards Europe that cannot be discussed in detail here 
is British participation in and (rapid) withdrawal from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(E.R.M.).  Britain entered the E.R.M. in 1990 in order to control inflation and left in 1992 so as to 
halt a dramatic slide in the value of sterling.  See H. Young, supra note 119, at 438-439.  See also 
R. Bennett and P. Webster, Warfare in Cabinet, a Spectacularly Wrong Bet, Political Blinkers.
No Wonder it Ended in Tears, THE TIMES, February 10, 2005, 4-5 (discussing newly released 
Treasury papers relevant to the decision to withdraw from the E.R.M.). 
177 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 15.  See also H. Young, supra note 119, at 186, et seq.
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integration have drawn a simple conclusion.  Europe is a potent threat to their 
“little world.”178 And, for this reason, they are often tempted to fall back on a 
narrative of insularity.  The contradictory impulses described here mean that 
British insularity is rather different from that found in the more inward looking 
religious communities described by Cover.  For the insularity of the British 
exhibits a particularly high degree of ambivalence.  And this ambivalence often 
finds expression in, and shapes, debate on Britain’s relations with Europe. 
 
Britain’s readiness to embrace the project of European integration first found 
expression in two unsuccessful applications (made in the 1960s) to join the 
European Economic Community.179 But, even as the first of these applications 
was under consideration, the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, felt the 
need to address the question of insularity.  He stated that, “[i]n the past ... we 
might give way to insular feelings of superiority over foreign breeds.”180 But, 
sounding a forward-looking note, he added that “we [now] have to consider the 
state of the world as it is today and will be tomorrow.”181 
This argument failed to convince the man responsible for the failure of Britain’s 
first application to join the E.E.C., French President, Charles de Gaulle.  In 1963, 
he vetoed Britain’s application, explaining that she was “insular” and that she had, 
“in all her doings, very marked and very original habits and traditions.”182 And, 
he took the same view in 1967, when he once again rebuffed the British.183 
However, a further bid for membership proved successful and Britain acceded to 
the E.E.C. in 1973 (by operation of the European Communities Act 1972).184 
Accession owed much to the efforts of the then Prime Minister, Edward Heath, 
 
178 The quotation in the text comes from W. Shakespeare, RICHARD II, II. i. (1597) and forms 
part of a speech in which John of Gaunt celebrates the insularity that he and his compatriots enjoy 
in their “fortress built by nature.”  
179 H. Young, supra note 119, at 128-135 and at 196-198.  
180 H. Macmillan, BRITAIN, THE COMMONWEALTH AND EUROPE (1962). 
181 Id. See also  H. Young, supra note 119, at 141. 
182 C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 117.  See also H. Young, supra note 119, at 128-
135. 
183 Id. at 196-198.  (Five days prior to de Gaulle’s second veto, the French Minister of 
Information, Georges Gorse, stated that “France in the past has sufficiently deplored British 
insularity not to rejoice over any trend in the opposite direction.”  See France Just a Bit More 
Friendly: Britain Seen as Less Insular, THE TIMES, 11 May 1967, 4. The view that the British 
are insular persists in France to this day.  For example, in 1996 the French Tourist Office analysed 
the British market and concluded that the British are “profoundly independent and insular.”  
PRÉSENTATION DE MARCHÉ BRITANNIQUE 12 (1996).) 
184 Section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 requires clashes between domestic (U.K.) 
law and European law to be resolved in favour of the latter. 
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“the most committed European to lead the country between 1945 and 1997.”185 
Heath pursued the end of accession with great “single-mindedness.”186 This was 
unsurprising.  For many years prior to entry, he had (in light of his experiences 
during World War Two as a British army officer) seen Europe as a redemptive 
force.187 Hence, his aim in seeking accession to the European Community was to 
help build “a strong Europe, which could speak with one voice.”188 
While Heath harboured the hope of “one voice” ringing out across Europe, he 
pursued his integrationist agenda in a refractory context.  The European 
Communities Act 1972 was passed in the teeth of fierce opposition, both from the 
Labour Party and from members of Heath’s own Conservative Party.  Prominent 
among the Conservative critics of accession was Enoch Powell.  Powell’s critique 
of Europe was nationalist (and, in all probability, informed by some degree of 
xenophobia).189 Powell was a forthright proponent of insularity.  He saw himself 
as speaking for those “who felt no country but this to be their own.”190 And while 
Heath emphasised the economic advantages of accession, Powell pointed up the 
political implications.  For example, in 1971, he told the Conservative Party’s 
annual conference that the British people would not tolerate “sovereignty being 
abolished or transformed.”191 Heath sought to meet this point in the White Paper 
published by his government prior to accession.  This document stated that 
“[t]here is no question of any erosion of essential national sovereignty.”192 To 
these reassuring words were added more in the same vein.  For the White Paper 
 
185 H. Young, supra note 119, at 255. 
186 Id. at 215. 
187Id. at 218 (on Heath’s military service on the Continent in the final year of World War II). 
188 E. Heath, THE COURSE OF MY LIFE 370 (1998). 
189 H. Young, supra note 119, at 240.  (During the 1970 General Election campaign, Powell 
identified accession to Europe as one of three significant threats to Britain.  The other two were 
communism and immigration.  See R. Blake, THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY FROM PEEL TO 
THATCHER 308 (1985).   
190 Cited in R. Shepherd, ENOCH POWELL 248 (1996). 
191 H. Young, supra note 119, at 242.  But see also 296-297 (where Young discusses opinion poll 
data gathered between 1961 and 1971 which found that, in a list of the aspects of Europe that 
people most disapproved of, having “no say in our own affairs” was chosen by only 3-4% of 
respondents).  
192 The United Kingdom and the European Communities (1971), Cmnd. 4715.  Cf 
PRO/F.C.O./30/1048, undated (confidential paper prepared for the Foreign Office in 1971; made 
available under the 30-year rule in 2001).  This paper analysed “the implications for British 
sovereignty of entry into the European Communities.”  The paper’s conclusion was that entry into 
Europe would result in very substantial constraints on Britain’s powers of self-government.  See 
also House of Lords, HANSARD, 2 August 1962, col. 418: Lord Dilhorne (Lord Chancellor in 
Harold Macmillan’s government) noted that the European Economic Community possessed 
“supra-national powers which override those of … national constitutional bodies.”     
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stated that “[w]hat is proposed is a sharing and an enlargement of individual 
national sovereignty in the general interest.”193 
But these words, while intended to reassure, were (and remain) a source of 
uncertainty.  For how can sovereignty at the national level be shared and enlarged 
without, at the same time, compromising the normative world and the narrative of 
insularity it works to underwrite?194 Nearly three decades after Britain’s 
accession to Europe, the courts were called upon to wrestle with this question in 
the case of the so-called “metric martyrs.”  In 2001, a judge held that a European 
directive overrode an Act of Parliament and provided a basis on which to 
prosecute a market trader for selling produce in “imperial” rather than metric 
measures.195 The judge explained that “[t]his country quite voluntarily 
surrendered the once seemingly immortal concept of the sovereignty of 
Parliament … by membership of the European Union.”196 But in a subsequent 
appeal, Laws L.J. staked out a very different position.  He concluded that E.U. 
law can only override the will of the legislature because Parliament (having 
enacted the European Communities Act 1972) permits it to do so.197 On his 
analysis, Parliament, “being sovereign,” could not “abandon its sovereignty,” and, 
hence, had effectively lent law-making powers to Europe.198 This analysis 
presents us with another self-referential claim to supremacy.199 And, as in the 
 
193 H. Young, supra note 119, at 242. 
194 Id. at 246.  
195 C. Booker and R. North supra note 111, at 406-407.  See also A. Marr, THE DAY BRITAIN 
DIED 187-189 (1999) (on the campaign mounted by the British Weights and Measures 
Association to identify compulsory metrification as a “constitutional abomination” through a 
campaign of “martyrdom”).  While the matter cannot be adequately addressed in this essay, 
martyrdom is an issue that features prominently in R.M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE 
LAW JOURNAL 1601, 1604 (1986) (arguing that “[m]artyrs require that any future they possess 
will be on the terms of the law to which they are committed”).  
196 Cited in C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 406.  (Use of this secondary source is 
necessary since the decision was not formally recorded.) 
197 Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] 3 W.L.R. 247 (Divisional Court of the Queen’s 
Bench Division).  This decision should be read against the background of the European Court of 
Justice’s and the House of Lords’ earlier decisions in R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex. p. 
Factortame (No. 2) [1991] AC 603.  When faced with a clash between a British Act of Parliament 
and (higher-order) European Community law, the E.C.J. applied the principle of the precedence of 
Community law and stated that directly applicable rules of Community law must be fully applied 
in all member-states from the date of their entry into force.  Thereafter, the House of Lords 
disapplied those provisions in the relevant Act that were incompatible with Community law.  (For 
more detailed discussion of Factortame, see A.W. Bradley, The Sovereignty of Parliament – Form 
or Substance, in J. Jowell and D. Oliver, THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION ch. 2 (2000)).  On 
the European Communities Act 1972, see supra note 184. 
198 Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, supra note 197, at 279.    
199 The position staked out by Laws L.J. in Thoburn exhibits a number of complexities.  He 
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case of Europe’s claim to supremacy, it works to underwrite the nomos it sustains 
(or, at least, seeks to sustain).  Only now the normative world that emerges as 
privileged is not European but British.   
 
Sovereignty has thus remained a (sometimes intensely) controversial matter.  But 
for some, at least, it lost its urgency in the years following accession.  This was 
true of many of those on the political left in Britain.  By the second half of the 
1980s, neither the issue of sovereignty nor a more general narrative of insularity 
stirred the leadership of the Labour Party.200 And, in the 1990s, Labour’s Tony 
Blair declared that, for Britain to hesitate before its European destiny would be to 
deny its “historical role” in the world.201 This explains why one commentator, 
Hugo Young, saw the return of a Labour government (in 1997) led by Blair as a 
“revolutionary moment.”202 For this, on Young’s analysis, “was ... the moment 
when passion dulled and struggle ceased: when … exclusive patriotism … finally 
lost [its] power of command.”203 This suggests that the narrative of insularity had 
been supplanted (or, at least, complemented) by the European narrative of 
redemption.  But matters are much less clear cut.  Blair has not embraced the 
project of European Monetary Union.204 And he has sought to encourage 
adoption of an Anglo-American (or Anglo-Saxon) approach to economic life.205 
Thus, his approach to Europe (like that of all his predecessors, save Heath) has 
been ambivalent.   
 
We see the same sort of ambivalence in the behaviour of the Prime Minister most 
associated with Euroscepticism, Margaret Thatcher    She made plain her hostility 
 
identified his decision as recognising “the proper supremacy of Community law” and “the proper 
supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament.”  Moreover, he stated that the former had to do 
with “the supremacy of substantive community law,” while the latter concerned the supremacy of 
the domestic legal framework within which Community law (currently) enjoys primacy.  He 
described this ultimately supreme domestic framework as “English law.”  See id. at 282-284.  See 
also at 278 (where Laws L.J. rejected the proposition that Community law can “entrench” itself as 
supreme in the U.K.).  Cf G. Marshall, Parliamentary Sovereignty: the New Horizons, PUBLIC 
LAW 1, 4 (1997) (arguing that “[t[he trend of Community jurisprudence is to suggest that 
Parliament … has abdicated its sovereignty”). 
200 H. Young, supra note 119, at 479.  
201 Speech at Chatham House, London, April 5, 1995. 
202 H. Young, supra note 119, at 488.   
203 Id. at 488. 
204 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 165-166. 
205 On Blair’s advocacy of the Anglo-American (or Anglo-Saxon) economic model, see S. Driver 
and L. Martell, NEW LABOUR: POLITICS AFTER THATCHERISM 47-49 (1998). 
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to the idea of Europe becoming a “super-state.”206 But she nonetheless played a 
significant part in establishing the single market.207 Likewise, Thatcher’s 
successor as Prime Minister, John Major exhibited an ambivalent attitude towards 
Europe.208 On becoming Prime Minister, he sounded a distinctly redemptive note 
by declaring: “I want us to be where we belong.  At the heart of Europe.  Working 
with our partners in building the future.”209 But, while making this bold 
statement, his administration declined to participate in the single currency and 
refused to embrace the Social Chapter.  Moreover, in his efforts to explain the 
adoption of these positions, he identified Britain as “a nation traditionally used to 
doing things its own way” and thus rehearsed the narrative of insularity.210 
The ambivalence towards Europe exhibited by Major, Thatcher, and Blair has a 
history that reaches back far beyond the project of integration inaugurated in the 
1950s.  For example, following Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the 
British Foreign Minister, Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, sought to secure 
peace in Europe through a system of multistate co-operation.211 To this end, 
Castlereagh used the post-war Congress of Vienna to establish a “Concert of 
Europe,” the aim of which was to maintain peace through a shared hegemony.212 
But this arrangement was not to the taste of Castlereagh’s successor as Foreign 
Minister, George Canning, who was determined to reduce the Concert to its 
component parts (nation-states focused on securing their own interests).213 In the 
respective positions of Castlereagh and Canning, we see approaches to Europe 
that persist to this day: on the one hand, readiness to foster constructive, and to 
some extent integrated, relations; on the other, a determination to ensure that 
Britain is not enmeshed in relations that reduce its freedom of action   
 
206 H. Young, supra note 119, at 346.  See also M. Thatcher, THE DOWNING STREET YEARS 
743 (1993) (stating that, prior to rejecting the idea of a European super-state, she had “heard about 
as much of the European ‘Ideal’ as [she] could take”). 
207 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 63. 
208 H. Young, supra note 119, at 465 (where Major is quoted as observing that, “[u]nlike any other 
European nation, we are genuinely split as to where our interests lie”). 
209 Speech, to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Bonn, 11 March 1990.  Major also described Europe 
as being “made up of nation-states” whose “vitality and diversity are sources of strength.”   See H. 
Young, supra note 119, at 424 and at 374. 
210 Id. at 466 (emphasis added). 
211 P. Bobbitt, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 
164-165 and 171 (2003). 
212 Id. at 165 and at 171.  See also at 171-172 (where Castelreagh’s “vision of equilibrium” 
(through multistate cooperation) is contrasted with the older notion of a “balance of power” 
(which assumed relations between European states to be competitive rather than cooperative)).   
213 Id. See also N. Davies, supra note 110, at 763 (where Canning is identified as having “killed” 
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Often, these attitudes are present in one and the same person.  This was true of 
Winston Churchill.  Eighteen months after the Allied victory in World War II, 
Churchill declared that “[w]e must recreate the European family.”214 He added 
that he had in mind a “regional structure,” “a kind of United States of Europe.”215 
While Churchill advocated a European union, he did not see Britain participating 
in the process he envisaged.  Rather than playing the part of participant, Britain 
should, on Churchill’s analysis, play the part of godmother or broker.216 Here, 
Churchill returned to a theme that had long informed his thinking.  In 1940, he 
had contemplated the possibility of European integration (following the ultimate 
defeat of Nazi Germany).  But, while the U.K. would be “closely connected” to 
any such process of integration, it would remain an insular community by 
standing “apart” from it.217 
Winston Churchill spoke in Zurich as the Leader of the official Opposition to the 
Labour Government.  But the Government’s stance on Europe was little different 
from Churchill’s.  The Government, like Churchill, saw Britain as a great power, 
and believed the country’s interest to lie in the intersection of three circles.  These 
circles represented Britain’s relations (as an independent state) with the United 
States, the Commonwealth, and non-communist Europe respectively.218 Given 
these relations, the U.K. (on the analyses of ministers and civil servants) had no 
pressing need to enter into a union with her European neighbours.  Others were, 
however, less sanguine.  For example, Sir Henry Tizard (an adviser at the 
Ministry of Defence) declared: “[w]e are not a Great Power and never will be 
again.  We are a great nation, but if we continue to behave like a Great Power we 
shall soon cease to be a great nation.”219 But this argument, unlike that offered by 
Churchill and echoed by the Government, failed to resonate.  For, in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, the temptations of insularity were irresistible.  The British 
“believed in their hearts that things British were necessarily things best.  They 
 
214 H. Young, supra note 119, at 16. 
215 Id.
216 Id. at 13. 
217 Id. (This strand of Churchill’s thinking on Europe can be traced back at least as far as 1930.  In 
that year, he declared: “We have our own dream and our own task...  We are with Europe but not 
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believed that they, above all their allies, had won the war.  They saw themselves 
still, like their grandfathers, as a senior and superior race.”220 
This view of the U.K. surely explains why some of those who have pushed Britain 
towards Europe, or played a part in the process of integration, have exhibited 
uneasiness about doing so.  Consider Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister from 
1957 until 1963, and the man responsible for Britain’s first application to join the 
E.E.C..  Relevant, here, is Hugo Young’s analysis of Macmillan’s approach to 
Europe.  He describes a “dank uncertainty” and a “visceral ambivalence” as 
attending Macmillan’s efforts to move Britain into the E.E.C.221 Young’s 
explanation as to why Macmillan approached Europe in this way is that “history 
rendered decisiveness impossible.”222 Macmillan wanted to “plunge[ ] towards 
the future” by embracing the European narrative of redemption.223 The project of 
European integration had excited him from the moment of its inception.  His 
response to the Schuman Plan had been to declare: “[it is] not just a piece of 
convenient machinery.  It is a revolutionary and almost mystical conception.”224 
But Macmillan was “besotted and ensnared by the past” and, thus, prey to the 
temptations of insularity.225 Hence, “helpless ambivalence” gripped him when he 
contemplated the normative world he sought to enter and the one he planned to 
leave behind.226 Indeed, so great did this uncertainty become that Macmillan was 
reduced to tears when discussing Britain’s first application to join the E.E.C. with 
the French President, Charles de Gaulle.227 This was during a meeting in which 
de Gaulle told Macmillan that Britain must choose Europe in preference to its 
relationship with the U.S.A. in order to be taken seriously as an applicant.228 A
220 J. Morris, FAREWELL TO TRUMPETS 473 (1979).  (On at least one occasion, Winston 
Churchill offered a broader variation on the same theme, stating that “only the English-speaking 
peoples count; … together they can rule the world.”  Statement recorded in the Eisenhower 
Library, Ann Whitman File, State Department (dinner 12 April 1954).  A broadly similar view of 
Anglo-American relations has recently been set out in R. Conquest, THE DRAGONS OF 
EXPECTATION: REALITY AND DELUSION IN THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2005) 
(arguing that the U.K. should leave the E.U. and form (in conjunction with the U.S.A., Australia, 
Canada, Caribbean states, and others, an “Anglosphere”).) 
221 H. Young, supra note 119, at 127 and at 140.   
222 Id. at 148. 
223 Id. at 132. 
224 A. Horne, MACMILLAN 1894-1956 319 (1988). 
225 H. Young, supra note 119, at 132. 
226Id. at 115.  See also at 121 (describing Macmillan as “a man at war with himself”).  See also R. 
Blake, supra note 189, at 285 (noting both Macmillan’s “romantic enthusiasm” for the 
Commonwealth and his readiness to subject Britain’s relations with Commonwealth members to 
cost-benefit analysis). 
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few days later, de Gaulle described Macmillan to his cabinet as “sad” and 
“beaten.”229 But Macmillan’s condition is perhaps better described as tending 
towards aporia - a state of perplexity so serious as to make decisive action and 
firmness of purpose impossible.230 
Profound unease (tending towards aporia) and a typically ambivalent readiness to 
participate in the project of integration describe only two of the three commonly 
encountered British responses to Europe.  A third response takes the form of 
Euroscepticism.  As will soon become apparent, this term is not altogether 
helpful.  For ‘Euroscepticism’ embraces a range of (more or less) unenthusiastic 
responses to the European narrative of redemption.  One of the more restrained 
forms of Euroscepticism is institutional.  The focus here is on the institutions and 
practices used to advance the process of integration.  And the gist of the criticism 
is that European institutions (e.g., the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament) and practices (such as qualified majority voting) fail adequately to 
secure British interests.231 
In some instances, the practical arrangements on which institutional 
Euroscepticism focuses provide the basis for a much stronger form of critique.  
This latter form of Euroscepticism finds expression in arguments to the effect that 
Europe is an anti-British conspiracy.  Relevant here is the E.U.’s Common 
Fisheries Policy (C.F.P.).  In the hours immediately before British accession to the 
E.E.C., its six member-states promulgated the entirely new C.F.P. in a 
regulation.232 Prominent in this regulation (the legal basis for which was unclear) 
was a principle of “equal access,” which gave Europe access to some of the 
world’s richest fishing grounds.233 Thus, Britain, an island “surrounded by a sea 
 
embraced.  See N. Davies, supra note 108, at 879 (discussing, inter alia, the proposal that the U.K. 
should seek to join the North American Free Trade Agreement (N.A.F.T.A.).) 
229 H. Young, supra note 119, at 136. 
230 On aporia, see S. Blackburn, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 21 (1994). 
231 See C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 197 (identifying the (intergovernmentally-
oriented) Council of Ministers as playing a “marginal” role in the European context) and at 444 
(describing the European Parliament as a “pretend-Parliament” that hosts “sham debates”).  On 
qualified majority voting, see J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 41.  (The practice of qualified majority 
voting has been most recently modified by the Nice Treaty.  The number of votes allocated to each 
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They have immediate effect.  See C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 122-123. 
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PRO/F.C.O.30/656-659 and F.C.O./954-978. 
34 Symposium: Robert M. Cover: Nomos and Narrative [2006], Article 3
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss8/art3
of fish” became an island surrounded by fishing vessels from, inter alia, France 
and (later) Spain.234 Even Hugo Young, a pro-European commentator, described 
the C.F.P. as “look[ing] like an amazing piece of chicanery.”235 Others are 
harsher in their assessment.  For example, Christopher Booker and Richard North 
find in the C.F.P. evidence of an anti-British conspiracy (led by the French, who 
succeeded in having the principle of “equal access” written into the relevant 
regulation).236 And they offer a broadly similar argument concerning Europe’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.).  They contend that, at the time the C.A.P. 
was being fashioned, the French President, Charles de Gaulle, was determined to 
ensure that it would operate on terms favourable to France.237 But, once this goal 
had been successfully pursued, the French were, according to Booker and North, 
ready to welcome Britain into the European fold.  For they knew that British 
contributions to the E.E.C.’s budget would subsidise French agriculture and 
Britain would provide a large market for its outputs.238 
In their arguments against the project of integration, Booker and North offer a 
rather strident variation on the theme of insularity. They unfold a narrative in 
which an embattled (and sometimes rather guileless) Britain is vulnerable to the 
threat of predation from Europe.239 This sort of narrative has a long history.240 
Consider, for example, the politicians and civil servants working under Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin in the 1950s.  They saw in the idea of European 
integration evidence of a Catholic conspiracy that would work to the disadvantage 
of Protestant Britain.241 Four decades later the source of the threat posed by 
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THE SUNDAY TIMES, December 4, 2005, 18 (arguing that “French leaders know that Europe 
[generally and the C.A.P. in particular are] about national interests”). 
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Europe had changed.  In 1990, the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 
Nicholas Ridley, described European integration as “a German racket designed to 
take over the whole of Europe.”242 
Views of this sort contrast sharply with the (comparatively anodyne) form of 
institutional Euroscepticism considered earlier.  They tend strongly in the 
direction of Europhobia.  Relevant here are the contrasts drawn by Hugo Young 
between Euroscepticism and Europhobia.  He describes the former as having 
some attractions.  For it suggests the “quest for objective truth” associated with 
scepticism.243 But matters are, on Young’s account, very different in the case of 
Europhobia.  For the Europhobe is in the grip of “raging furies,” and these furies 
find expression in uncompromising narratives of insularity.244 Narratives of this 
sort were a prominent feature of British political life in the 1990s.  Some 
members of John Major’s Cabinet argued for a future outside the European 
Union.  For example, Peter Lilley argued that Britain could, and should, regain its 
independence and become a “nuclear Switzerland.”245 Outside government, 
others took up broadly similar positions.  Max Beloff, for example, saw the E.U. 
as a standing threat to British identity.246 
While John Major never spoke in such stark terms himself concerning Europe, he 
nonetheless unfolded a narrative of insularity.  For it was his belief that the 
nation-state would, and should, “remain the basic political unit for Europe.”247 
And, like the more extreme Eurosphobes, Major was ready to describe those 
favourably disposed towards Europe in the sort of language typically reserved, in 
 
242 Id. at 362.  See also at 360 (where Young discusses the day-long conference on German 
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Callaghan described the French as “awful.”  See C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 164. 
243 H. Young, supra note 119, at 397. 
244 Id. Cf C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 434 (describing “‘the E.U.’s sympathisers” 
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time of war, for collaborators and traitors.248 Thus, he described Tony Blair’s 
predecessor as Leader of the Labour Party, John Smith, as “Monsieur Oui, the 
poodle of Brussels.”249 
Between the two positions so far considered (comparatively mild institutional 
Euroscepticism and Europhobia), we find at least two broad forms of 
Euroscepticism, to which the labels “economic Euroscepticism” and “cultural 
Euroscepticism” may be applied.  Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech of 1988 
provides an example of the former.  “We have not”, she said, “successfully rolled 
back the frontiers of the state in Britain in order to have them reimposed at a 
European level.”250 Her target was European “social policy” (laws aimed at 
protecting workers’ interests).251 Margaret Thatcher saw these laws as burdens on 
business that would reduce Britain’s competitiveness and appeal to inward 
investors.252 But, while this critique is economic in thrust, it cannot be 
unscrambled from politics.  For in the days immediately preceding her speech in 
Bruges, Thatcher’s hostility to Europe grew in intensity.  This is because Jacques 
Delors had stated, at the British Trades Union Congress’s annual conference, that, 
within ten years, “80 per cent of [all] social legislation” would be made in 
Brussels.253 Moreover, Margaret Thatcher’s hostility towards the project of 
integration grew during the last two years of her premiership (1989-1990).  
Indeed, it ultimately found expression not in a conventional narrative of insularity 
but rather in a stark refusal to embrace Delors’ agenda.  On her return from a 
meeting of the European Council in Rome in October 1990, Thatcher rose in the 
House of Commons and declared: 
 
248 Cf the narrative of (thwarted) insularity set out in A. Roberts, THE AACHEN 
MEMORANDUM (1996).  In this (absurd) fictional work, the E.U. has facilitated a re-emergence 
of Nazism.  As a consequence, England is governed by Germans who seek to destroy a 
distinctively English culture by, inter alia, assassinating Margaret Thatcher, punishing women 
who shave their armpits, and forcing letter writers to use a postcode when corresponding.  (While 
Roberts’ fiction provides a particularly extreme example of Europhobia, other commentators have 
associated the project of integration with an effort to destroy British or English identity.  See, for 
example, R. Scruton, ENGLAND: AN ELEGY 253 (2001) (arguing that “England has finally 
been disposed of” as a result of the publication of an official European Union map which divides 
Europe into “regions” and which omits to make reference to England.).) 
249 House of Commons, HANSARD, 22 March 1994, col. 134. 
250 See http://www.brugesgroup.com/mediacentre/index.live?article=92 (where the text of 
Margaret Thatcher’s speech is reproduced).  In his Foreword to the speech, Martin Holmes argues 
that the position she staked out encouraged the development of Euroscepticism in the various 
forms it now assumes.    See also A. Sked and C. Cook, supra note 119, at 540.  
251 J. Pinder, supra note 116, at 94-99. 
252 M. Thatcher, THE PATH TO POWER 484 (1995). 
253 A. Sked and C. Cook, supra note 119, at 540. 
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The President of the Commission, Mr. Delors, said at a press 
conference … that he wanted the European Parliament to be the 
democratic body of the Community.  He wanted the Commission to 
be the executive and he wanted the Council of Ministers to be the 
senate.  No.  No.  No.254 
In the years since Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech and her monosyllabic 
assault on Monsieur Delors, commentators have pressed her economically-
oriented critique of Europe in a number of directions.  Some, for example, see in 
Europe’s approach to economic activity, threats of the sort described by Friedrich 
Hayek in his account of centrally planned or administered economic activity.255 
On Hayek’s account, central planning can be expected (other things being equal) 
to limit the gains resulting from economic activity.  This is because those who 
make the relevant plans necessarily lack sufficient information to secure the full 
benefits of trade.  But (so Hayek’s argument runs) planners often assume that they 
have sufficient information to optimise the benefits of economic activity.  And 
where this is the case, they fall victim to what he calls the “synoptic delusion.”256 
This delusion afflicts those who assume that all relevant facts can be known to 
some one mind and that it is, hence, “possible to construct from this knowledge of 
the particulars a desirable social order.”257 According to Hayek, the synoptic 
delusion informs a species of practical thought to which he gives the name 
“constructivist rationalism.”  He explains that constructivist rationalism “assumes 
that all social institutions are, and ought to be, the product of deliberate 
design.”258 And this assumption, so Hayekian critics of the European Union 
argue, has informed the thinking of those who have sought to advance the project 
of European integration.259 For they assume that they have at their disposal a 
 
254 HANSARD, October 30, 1990, col. 873.  (While Margaret Thatcher’s Euroscepticism reached 
a crescendo in the last two years of her Premiership, it was a leitmotif throughout her stay in 
Downing Street.  Shortly after becoming Prime Minster in 1979, she declared: “[w]e believe in a 
free Europe, not a standardised Europe.”  See S. George, supra note 174, at 61 (emphasis added).)     
255 See, for example, J. Gillingham, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1950-2003: SUPERSTATE 
OR NEW MARKET ECONOMY? xiii and 6 (2003) (arguing against “positive integration” (“the 
organisation of Europe by means of bureaucracy and regulation”) and arguing for “negative 
integration” (which gives effect to the “competition principle” and “sets in motion a mutually 
reinforcing reciprocal process in which the market and self-government [at the national level] 
together … promote economic growth”).   
256 F. A. Hayek, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: Vol. I, 
RULES AND ORDER 14 (1982). 
257 Id.
258 Id. at 5.  See also F.A. Hayek, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF FRIEDRICH AUGUST 
HAYEK, vol. I THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 60-62 (1988, W.W. 
Bartley III, ed.). 
259 See, J. Gillingham, supra note 255. 
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method (constructivist rationalism) that will enable them to turn a narrative of 
(economic) redemption into a set of concrete realities. 
 
While economic arguments against Europe are often sharply critical, they do not 
sound the intensely emotional note that typically informs those critiques that 
make appeal to cultural identity.  Arguments of this latter sort are profoundly 
insular in orientation.260 Moreover, they have been around for a long time.  
Progenitors of culturally-oriented Euroscepticism were writing in the eighteenth 
century.  Thus we find Edmund Burke, in his critique of the French Revolution, 
arguing that distinct communities should not be reduced to a “homogeneous 
mass.”261 Instead, the “little platoon” should be valued.262 For it provides a 
context in which people can acquire a “second nature” that will invest their lives 
with significance.263 A century and half later, Burke’s “little platoon” had 
become George Orwell’s England-as-“family.”264 According to Orwell, this 
family exhibited “emotional unity” much like that described by Cover in his 
account of padeic communities.265 Moreover, the family described by Orwell 
exhibited commitment to a body of law that was “assumed to be unalterable.”266 
Two decades later this sort of analysis was still resonating powerfully in the U.K.  
At the Labour Party’s Annual Conference in 1962, Hugh Gaitskell (then Labour’s 
leader) spoke on the topic of possible accession to the European Economic 
Community.  He told his audience that participation in the project of integration 
would be a betrayal of “a thousand years of history” and “the end of Britain as an 
 
260 Culturally-oriented Euroscepticism privileges the nomos it seeks to defend.  But it does not 
follow from this point that those who embrace this sort of position are insensitive to the value of 
other worlds or unwilling to enter into co-operative relations with those who live within them.  
(The discussion of Hugh Gaitskell’s views at infra notes 267-269, below, lends support to this 
view.)      
261 E. Burke, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 300 (1790, C. Cruise 
O’Brien, ed.).  (While the point cannot be examined in detail here, culturally-oriented 
Euroscepticism was anticipated in F. Nietzsche, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL pt viii (1990, R.J. 
Hollingdale, trans.).  See at 171 and at 184-185 (where Nietzsche notes that Europe’s various 
cultures are made up of “dull, sluggish” people (e.g., the unphilosophical and plebeian British) 
who can be expected to act in ways inimical to the pursuit of unity).  See also at 189 (where 
Nietzsche notes that “Europe wants to become one”).  On occasion, Nietzsche himself seems to 
express some distaste for Europe.  See, for example, F. Nietzsche, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY 
AND THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 177 (1956, F. Golffing, trans) (arguing that “[t]he 
levelling and diminution of European man is our greatest danger”).) 
262 E. Burke, supra note 261, at 135. 
263 Id. at 299. 
264 G. Orwell, THE LION AND THE UNICORN: SOCIALISM AND THE ENGLISH GENIUS 
49 and 52-53 (1941). 
265 Id. at 52. 
266 Id. at 44. 
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independent European state.”267 This speech was, to be sure, a narrative of 
insularity.  But Gaitskell could see beyond the “world” he sought to defend.  He 
frankly acknowledged that a high price may be paid for independence.  For 
Britain could become “a little island off Europe.” overshadowed by “a tough, 
strong European state.”268 Moreover, he was anxious to preserve Britain’s ties 
with the Commonwealth and the U.S.A.269 For Gaitskell saw these relationships 
as having shaped Britain’s distinctive form of life.  Thus, he set out a speech in 
which he sought to propitiate the (nomos-shaping) past.270 And this emphasis on 
the past had clear implications for the future.  To accept Gaitskell’s argument 
against accession to Europe was to accept a status quo and a narrative of 
insularity that would stretch into the indefinite future.271 
A striking feature of Gaitskell’s speech was its emotional power.272 This power 
seems to have derived from a number of sources.  In common with other cultural 
narratives it “plucked the mystic chords of memory.”273 And, by making appeal 
to Commonwealth ties, Gaitskell invoked both the idea of the Commonwealth as 
a progressive multi-racial entity and the idea of a “Greater Britain.”274 But it is 
perfectly possible to argue for the preservation of a distinct form of life in more 
measured terms.  Conor Cruise O’Brien has set out just such an argument.  He 
 
267 H. Young, supra note 119, at 163.  See also at 151 (describing Gaitskell’s speech as 
Euroscepticism’s “seminal moment”) and at 240 (describing Gaitskell as having stirred a “demon” 
that was to return in the 1970s in the Eurosceptical speeches of, inter alios, Enoch Powell). 
268 Id. at, 159. 
269 Id. at 156.
270 Id. at 164.  
271Id. at 162.  See also M. Bradbury, DANGEROUS PILGRIMAGES: TRANS-ATLANTIC 
MYTHOLOGIES AND THE NOVEL 475 (1995) (arguing that the view of England (if not 
Britain) as a “land of eternal stasis” first found expression in the works of an American, 
Washington Irving (1783-1859).  The sort of “stasis” Bradbury describes is celebrated in, for 
example, S. Baldwin, Speech to the Annual Dinner of the Royal Society of St George, 6 May, 
1924, and in J. Major, speech to the Conservative Group for Europe, 12 April, 1993. 
272 See H. Young, supra note 119, at 164 (noting, inter alia, that a piece in the Evening Standard 
identified “nobody [as having] coughed or stirred” during the speech).  See also P. Gowan, British 
Euro-Solipsism, ch. 6 in P. Gowan, and P. Anderson (eds), THE QUESTION OF EUROPE 103 
(1997) (stating that “the passion at Brighton [where Gaitskell spoke] exceeded [that shown by 
Margaret Thatcher in] Bruges”). 
273 H. Young, supra, note 119, at 164. 
274Id. at 156 (noting that the idea of the multi-racial Commonwealth as “one of the great 
progressive manifestations of the history of mankind” had been advanced shortly before 
Gaitskell’s speech by a Labour Member of Parliament, Maurice Edelman).  The idea of a “Greater 
Britain,” embracing the indigenous British and those in the (imperial) British diaspora was 
advanced in J.R. Seeley, THE EXPANSION OF ENGLAND: TWO COURSES OF LECTURES 
(1886), and embraced by politicians including Joseph Chamberlain.  See N. Ferguson. EMPIRE: 
HOW BRITAIN MADE THE MODERN WORLD 248-251 (2004) (discussing Seeley’s and 
Chamberlain’s views on “the ideal of Greater Britain”).  
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contends that “[t]he idea of the United States of Europe is a dangerous mirage.”275 
This is because “[t]he European states with the exception of Belgium are also 
nations.”276 And these nations are, on O’Brien’s analysis, resistant to the process 
of integration.  Arguments such as Gaitskell’s make plain the source of this 
resistance.  It arises in normative worlds that are rich and enduring sources of 
value, meaning, and identity.277 
Each of the forms of Euroscepticism we have examined throws light on British 
unease with the project of European integration.  But the cultural identity-based 
form of Euroscepticism is the most pertinent to this discussion.  For those who 
offer culturally-oriented arguments against Europe see the process of integration 
as portending the end of their own narratives and the worlds they sustain.  Thus 
they harbour misgivings that are unlikely to be assuaged by those who emphasise 
the benign aims that would be served by further integration.  Examination of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which featured in the ill-fated Constitutional 
Treaty, affords a basis on which to explain why this is so. 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Euroscepticism 
 
Had the Constitutional Treaty been ratified, the central purpose of the Charter 
would have been to protect a range of fundamental interests shared by all 
“citizens” of the E.U.  To this end, the Charter (in common with other human 
rights instruments) enunciated a broad range of rights.  They included the right to 
integrity of the person, respect for private life, and freedom of expression.278 But 
the Charter also identified the “national identities,” “cultures,” and “traditions” of 
the E.U.’s member-states as worthy of respect.279 Thus the Charter had a 
 
275 C. Cruise O.Brien, Pursuing a Chimera, ch. 4.in P. Gowan and P. Anderson (eds), supra note 
272. 
276 Id.
277 Some commentators speak in general terms about the undesirability of central regulation of 
practical life in Europe and apply this point to a detailed analysis of U.K.-E.U. relations.  See, for 
example, P. Morgan, ALARMING DRUM: BRITAIN’S EUROPEAN DILEMMA 1-5 (2005).  
(The concepts of value, meaning, and identity merit mention in the text for this reason.  Each of 
them features prominently in R.M. Cover, supra note 1. Cover identifies values as products of 
prior processes of narration (id. at 45).  He also identifies values (most obviously, those in the law) 
as (nomos-shaping) sources of meaning (id. at 12).  Moreover, he identifies the worlds shaped by 
particular values and meanings as sources of identity (id. at 28).)  
278 The Charter of Fundamental Rights also sets out a commitment to the protection of human 
dignity.  Moreover, Article II-82 is particularly germane to this discussion.  For it states that “[t]he 
Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.” 
279 Charter of Rights, Preamble.  (The Charter appears to be informed by the assumption that 
“national identities”, etc., are perdurable.  This assumption is questionable.  See R. Colls, supra 
note 175, at 5 (2002) (arguing that, by the 1990s, national identity was “unravelling with 
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subsidiary purpose (the protection of distinct forms of life) not always found in 
human rights instruments.  However, there are reasons for supposing that the 
E.U.’s commitment to this latter objective was far from strong.  For, while the 
Charter set out in clear terms the rights it would have protected, it made only 
fleeting references to “national identities,” “cultures,” and “traditions.”280 
Moreover, it did not clearly state how these sources of value, meaning, and 
identity were to have been protected.281 
In light of these points, we have grounds for seeing the two purposes noted here 
as standing not in a complementary relationship but, rather, in one of binary 
opposition.282 In this binary opposition, the protection of citizens’ human rights 
occupied a privileged position.  By contrast, “cultures” and “traditions,” etc., 
stood in a disprivileged or (perhaps even) marginalised position.  Willingness to 
downplay the significance of local concerns in the way suggested here is not 
altogether surprising.  For those who seek to advance the project of integration 
often argue that Europe (or, more particularly, its member-states) should speak 
with “one voice.”  This is true, for example of former President of the European 
Commission, Romano Prodi.283 
The notion of “one voice” points up the threat that the Charter may pose to 
members of particular communities.  And we can begin to grasp the nature of this 
threat by drawing on Cover and those writers used earlier to gloss and develop 
certain strands of his argument in Nomos and Narrative. Given the features of the 
Charter already noted, we might see it as an instrument that tends in a direction 
that Bakhtin would recognise as monologic.  The obvious objection to this 
suggestion is that the Charter states that “national identity,” “culture,” and 
“tradition” merit respect.  And respect would surely not be forthcoming in 
circumstances where citizens could not give adequate expression to these local 
sources of value, meaning, and identity.  But any such response would be too 
 
astonishing speed” in England and Britain more generally).  But cf A.A. Gill, I Hate England,
THE SUNDAY TIMES, October 30, 2005, 1-2 (News Review) (arguing that “constant … 
grievance at the deviousness and mendacity … of the rest of the world” mark the English out as 
distinctive).) 
280 R. Mullender, Hegel, Human Rights, and Particularism 30 JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
SOCIETY 554, 571 (2003). 
281 Id.
282 See supra note 33 (on the tense nature of binary oppositions). 
283 See C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 400 and at 409.  See also at 419 (on Javier 
Solana, who (in his capacity as the European Union’s (foreign affairs-related) “High 
Representative”) has also used the “one voice” trope).   And see I. Ward, The End of Sovereignty 
and the New Humanism 55 STAN. L. REV. 2091, 2099 (2003) (discussing use of the “one voice” 
trope to justify a European role in foreign relations), and supra note 188 (and associated text) (on 
Edward’s Heath’s use of the “one voice” trope).   
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crude to be convincing.  It would fail to pay due regard to the Charter’s emphasis 
on rights and its lack of emphasis on “national identity,” etc.  These features of 
the Charter suggest that two questionable assumptions may have informed the 
thinking of its framers.  The first assumption is that local sources of value, 
meaning, and identity are of little consequence and, hence, should not figure 
prominently in the Union’s practical life.  The second assumption is that the 
project of integration and local sources of meaning, etc., stand in a harmonious, 
and unproblematic, relationship relative to one another.  The first of these 
assumptions poses the threat of denarration.284 For local sources of value, 
meaning and identity are in danger of being weakened by or erased in the 
discourse of the European Union.285 The second assumption poses a threat that is 
less stark: “culture,” “tradition,” and “national identity” are seen as enduring (but 
only on the basis that they are lesser parts of a larger and practically more 
significant whole).   
 
Views of the sort set out by Hugh Gaitskell provide a basis on which to explain 
why these assumptions are questionable.  Gaitskell, and others like him, tell the 
story of a particular nomos in terms that Cover would immediately recognise.  
The story in question invariably runs on the theme of a significant measure of 
independence for a particular world as a live and eligible option.  But this is an 
option that the proponents of integration are (or, at least, seem to be) loath to 
entertain.  Their reluctance finds expression in the scant references to local 
sources of value, meaning, and identity in the Charter.  And these few references 
at least suggest that the integration project is monologic in orientation, 
notwithstanding the fact that regular and intense dialogue is a feature of the 
Union’s practical life.  For the dialogue in question has to do (ultimately) with the 
 
284 R. Mullender, supra note 280, at 571 (drawing on Douglas Coupland, POLAROIDS FROM 
THE DEAD 179 (1997).  See also B. Anderson, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS 
ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 205-206 (1991) (on the need for 
(national and personal) narratives of identity that are “our own”). 
285 Id. Relevant to the point made in the text is the controversy generated by the publication of J.-
P. Duroselle, EUROPE: A HISTORY OF ITS PEOPLES (1991), the preparation of which was 
supported by the European Commission.  Duroselle stated that “[t]here are solid historical reasons 
for regarding Europe not only as a mosaic of cultures but as an organic whole.”  He then offered 
an account of this “organic whole” from which the contributions of ancient Greek culture were 
largely omitted.  This generated a controversy so acute that the European Commission dissociated 
itself from Duroselle’s text and his larger project (“[a]n adventure in understanding,” celebrating 
European “unity in diversity”).  For further discussion of the Duroselle controversy, see N. 
Davies, supra note 110, at 43-44.  (A variation on the theme of denarration is offered in P. 
Anderson, The Europe to Come, ch. 9 in P. Gowan, and P. Anderson (eds), supra note 272, at 126 
(arguing that Europe is a “metonym: i.e., a “part” that comes to stand for “the whole”).)    
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means by which to pursue the end of closer union.  Thus those who participate in 
it do no more than shape a larger monologue.286 
On the assumption that this analysis is correct, we should expect to find among 
the proponents of integration a reluctance to engage in genuine dialogue on 
Europe’s future.  And examples of just this sort of reluctance are easy to find.  
When Hugh Gaitskell shared with Jean Monnet his misgivings concerning the 
project of integration he was met not with the reasoned response he requested but, 
rather, with the injunction to “have faith.”287 A similarly unyielding response has 
recently been made by Jean-Claude Juncker (while presiding over the European 
Council) immediately after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France 
and Holland.  He stated that the voters in these countries should vote again “until 
they get it right.”288 Moreover, on learning that his plan was not going to be 
implemented, Juncker’s response suggests the frustration of the thwarted 
monologist.  He declared that he had “[n]o comment, no opinion and no advice [to 
offer], because people are obviously not interested in my advice.”289 
While Juncker presents himself as offering “advice,” his comments, and others 
like them, suggest distaste for dialogue at the heart of Europe.  Certainly, one 
French commentator, Jean Baudrillard, has grown uneasy about the way in which 
Europe’s proponents are seeking to pursue their redemptive agenda.  Baudrillard 
has concluded that Europe’s claims to be democratic have been weakened in the 
wake of the referendum results.290 And this has led him to declare that “[b]eyond 
the figure of the passive manipulated voter stands that of the hostage-citizen.”291 
Talk of the “hostage-citizen” will strike many as overstated.  But the impression 
that Europe is insensitive to the rudiments of democratic governance has been 
powerfully reinforced by a recent decision of the European Commission.  
Following the referendum results in France and Holland, the Commission has 
decided to incorporate the Charter of Fundamental Rights into all proposed 
legislation.292 But we should note that, in the wake of the French and Dutch 
referendums, some of the proponents of integration have exhibited attentiveness 
to their critics.  The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, 
has responded to the French and Dutch votes by stating that he and his colleagues 
 
286 See supra note 84 (on means-related dialogue). 
287 H. Young, supra note 119, at 151. 
288 S. Jenkins, supra note 169, at 1 (emphasis added). 
289 THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, June 19 2005, 4, News. 
290 J. Baudrillard, Holy Europe, 33 NEW LEFT REVIEW 24 (2005). 
291 Id. at 25. 
292 P. Hennessey, E.U. Sneaks in Charter By Back Door, THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, October 
16, 2005, 1-2.  (The Commission’s decision is set out in Commission document COM. (2005) 
172.) 
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recognise that support for “the European idea” has weakened.293 And, as a result, 
he has conceded that “[w]e will not have the constitution in the next few 
years.”294 This last statement does, however, suggest, and the decision to write 
the Charter into legislative proposals confirms, a commitment, on the part of 
Barroso and his colleagues, to advance the integration agenda. 
 
But they now find themselves in a context where wide-ranging dialogue appears 
to be unavoidable.  For, on taking up the Presidency of the European Council (in 
July 2005), Tony Blair scheduled (for the autumn of 2005) a special summit on 
the future of the European Union.295 Blair’s readiness to address this matter so 
directly is hardly surprising. The agonies experienced by Harold Macmillan in his 
dealings with Europe afford a basis on which to explain why this is so.  As we 
have noted, Macmillan wished to “plunge[ ] towards the future” by embracing 
Europe and its narrative of redemption.296 But he was also “besotted [with] and 
ensnared by the past.”297 Thus he was the living embodiment of the 
communitarian embeddedness thesis.  He was (to use Cover’s phrase) the bearer 
of a particular “life-vision.”298 And those gripped by such a practical outlook are 
typically reluctant to forsake it.  For it gives expression not just to ends that they 
assume to be worthy of pursuit but also to a world that shapes their self-
understanding.  In such circumstances, the looming project of integration becomes 
a source of deep unease.  In the particular case of Macmillan, the upshot was a 
mental state tending towards aporia.  While Tony Blair has not been afflicted by 
uncertainties sufficient to reduce him to tears, he has sounded an ambivalent – if 
not aporetic - note by identifying himself as both “pro-European” and a “realistic 
Eurosceptic.”299 This is unsurprising.  For, like Macmillan, he has recognised that 
 
293 N. Watt, World Leader Who Can Look Protestors In the Eye, THE GUARDIAN, July 1, 2005, 
12. 
294 Id.
295 P. Webster, Day One of Presidency Sets Tone For E.U. Reform, THE TIMES, July 2, 2005, 2.   
(At the time this essay was being completed, the U.K. government had scheduled a meeting of 
E.U. heads of state and government that will take place on October 27, 2005.  In his letter of 
invitation to those expected to attend, Tony Blair has stated that his “biggest ambition for this 
meeting is for us to work together in a spirit of collective endeavour, and demonstrate that we can 
respond to the challenges of the day and that the European project continues to move forward.”  
This letter was published on the European Commission’s website (Europa) on October 25, 2005.  
See also European Values in a Globalised World (Contribution of the Commission to the October 
Meeting of Heads of State and Government), European Commission, COM. (2005) 525 (final) 
(discussing, inter alia, the “role” of Europe and “the national level”).)  
296 Supra note 223 (and associated text). 
297 Supra note 225 (and associated text). 
298 See supra note 74 (and associated text). 
299 A. Treneman, Astride His Horse, Our Hero Fights For Pro-European Scepticism, THE 
TIMES, June 21, 2005, 27.  See also H. Young, supra note 119, at 527 (emphasis added) (raising 
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the E.U.’s ends and those of the U.K. stand in a relationship of tension.  This 
becomes clear when, for example, he contrasts his commitment to labour market 
flexibility with the “social model” favoured by Europe.300 Here, we see Blair 
privileging a local agenda.  And, when a local agenda is privileged in this way, 
the relevance of the embeddedness thesis to our area of concern becomes 
apparent.  Those embedded in a particular nomos are apt see it as their 
“paramount reality” and to act in accordance with the values and ends that give it 
its distinctive shape.301 
In another respect, the communitarian strand in Cover’s thought speaks to E.U.-
U.K. relations.  Cover, as we have noted, argues that activity that works to 
undermine or destroy a nomos gives rise to significant loss.  Walzer presses this 
point further when he argues that we should, as a matter of justice, respect the 
institutions and practices in which humankind’s culture-creating capacities find 
expression.  Respecting the culture-creating capacities of human beings is 
something that the E.U. might claim to be doing in the Charter of Rights.  For this 
instrument identifies member-states’ “cultures,” “traditions,” and “national 
identities” as worthy of respect.  But against this must be set the point that the 
Charter does not spell out in clear terms the means by which the E.U. will deliver 
on the promise of “respect.”   
 
The obvious response to this point is that the European Court of Justice will apply 
the principle of subsidiarity in ways that confer adequate respect on “cultures,” 
etc.  But any such answer seems unlikely to convince culturally-focused 
 
doubts about the plausibility of Blair’s (earlier) declaration that Britain “must overcome its 
ambivalence about Europe”).  (Blair made this declaration in a speech delivered at Aachen on May 
14, 1999.) 
300 P. Webster, supra note 295.  See also H. Young, supra note 119, at 490 (discussing speeches 
made by Blair (on becoming Prime Minister) in favour of labour market flexibility), and at 521 
(where Young notes that the European Council gave qualified support to Blair’s reform agenda in 
1999).  For further discussion of Blair’s preferred (Anglo-American or Anglo-Saxon) approach to 
economics and the continental (or Rhineland or social market) alternative, see S. Driver and L. 
Martell, supra note 205, at 47, et seq. See also “Battle for Europe”, Panorama, B.B.C. 1, 
November 27, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/4464364.stm (where the 
programme’s presenter, Alan Little, contrasts Britain’s commitment to “the Anglo-Saxon 
[economic] model” with French and German commitment with “the European social model” and 
an emerging “Nordic model” that combines “a strong and competitive economy” with a 
“generous” welfare state).  
301 See P.L. Berger and T. Luckmann, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A 
TREATISE ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 34 (emphasis added) (1966) (where the 
authors make the strong empirical claim that “consciousness always returns to the paramount [i.e.,
local] reality as from an excursion” to other “finite provinces of meaning”).  Cf W. Rees Mogg, 
supra note 169 (on “normal [i.e., national] sovereignty” as the nation-states’ “default setting” in 
Europe).   
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Eurosceptics.  For the E.C.J. enjoys “competence-competence”: i.e., it determines 
the division of labour in the European Union as between the supranational 
institutions and those at member-state (or regional) level.302 Moreover, the E.C.J. 
has, inter alia, the task of advancing the E.U.’s purposes.303 These points go a 
long way towards explaining why, inter alios, British Eurosceptics view both the 
principle of subsidiarity and the E.C.J. with a jaundiced eye.  Thus we find the 
Conservative Member of Parliament, William Cash declaring that “subsidiarity is 
a con trick.  It is said that there will be a devolution downwards of functions ….  
However, the critical fact is that the main functions will be transferred 
upwards.”304 And, in similarly sceptical vein, we find another Conservative 
politician, Iain Duncan-Smith describing the E.C.J. as a “political court,” centrally 
concerned with advancing the agenda of integration.305 For these (and other such) 
critics of Europe, the E.C.J. cannot be expected to ensure that “culture,” 
“tradition,” etc., are accorded adequate respect.  For, on their analysis, adequate 
respect requires an abandonment of the project of integration. 
 
There are reasons for thinking that the problems with which the E.C.J. and other 
decision-makers in the E.U. will have to grapple are intractable.  Cover sets out 
one such reason.  In circumstances where nomoi come into contact with one 
another, their relationship is often fraught with tension (not least because they 
commonly speak to the same practical concerns in very different terms).  To this 
we may add a further reason, which finds expression in the writings of Berlin and 
Raz.  They explain the sort of tension described by Cover by reference to (the fact 
of) value incommensurability.  Berlin (drawing on, inter alios, Vico and Herder) 
argues that national cultures are unique and, hence, not amenable to ranking on a 
common scale.306 Thus, the attempt to integrate them into a harmonious whole is 
a practical impossibility.  Moreover, the pursuit of this objective bespeaks the 
 
302 J. Shaw, supra note 5, at 142.  See also A. Estella, THE E.U. PRINCIPLE OF 
SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS CRITIQUE 137 and 177 (2002), and P. Syrpis, In Defence of 
Subsidiarity 24 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 323 (2004). 
303 Id. at 324. 
304 HANSARD, 20 May 1992, col. 314. 
305 H. Young, supra note 119, at 402.  See also J. Gillingham, Let the Turks In to Finish Off the 
Euro Superstate, THE SUNDAY TIMES, June 5, 2005, 17 (arguing that “[t]he European Court of 
Justice must be reconstituted as an impartial arbiter rather than continuing to function as an 
integration engine”), J. Gillingham, supra note 255 (arguing that “in the years when the 
Community seemed to be dormant, the E.C.J. almost unobtrusively extended its reach deep into 
the national laws of the member-states”), and H. Rasmussen, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE – A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICY-
MAKING (1986) (arguing that the E.C.J. is engaged in integration-focused policy-making, far 
beyond the limits of relevant legal norms and public tolerance). 
306 I. Berlin, supra note 75, at 55.   See also B. Williams, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF 
PHILOSOPHY 157-158 (1985). 
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adoption of an outlook that Berlin finds unappealing and that he calls the 
“worship on oneness.”307 By now, the way in which Berlin’s argument speaks to 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and E.U.-U.K. relations should be obvious.  
The Charter assumes the possibility of a harmonious whole in which two nomoi 
(that of the E.U. and that of the U.K.) nestle beside one another 
unproblematically.  On the sort of view offered by Berlin, however, this 
assumption is unsound.308 Moreover, “the worship of oneness” speaks to the 
same practical concerns raised by Bakhtin in his account of monologism.  For 
Berlin states that the worship of oneness may issue in “the vivisection of actual 
human societies” according to “some fixed pattern.”309 The sociologist, Zygmunt 
Bauman, has recently spelled out the relevance of Berlin’s point in the European 
context.  Bauman points up “Europe’s discovery of culture as an activity 
performed by humans on the human world.”310 Moreover, he emphasises the 
resistance of cultures to “tinkering.”311 And, in light of these points, he concludes 
that culture is not, and should not be seen as being, something that can be 
monopolised.312 
Raz usefully supplements Berlin’s arguments by introducing the concept of 
constitutive incommensurabilities.  In his account of these incommensurabilities, 
Raz identifies agents and communities as the guardians (and – in some 
circumstances – possibly the creators) of particular values.313 For they sustain the 
understanding of particular values as unique by refusing to place them on a metric 
of more general application.  Thus, Raz gives us a conceptual tool that makes it 
possible to understand the effort that the members of a community pour into the 
activity of sustaining their shared understanding of their form of life.  And we see 
just this sort of effort being made by Hugh Gaitskell in the speech we considered 
earlier.  Moreover, a speech made by another Labour politician captures the 
outlook of those (such as Gaitskell) who see themselves as defenders of an 
independent British form of life and the relationships that have sustained it.  In 
response to the Macmillan government’s decision to apply for membership of the 
 
307 Id. at 56-57. 
308 See J. Shaw, supra note 5, at 139-40 (arguing that E.U.-member-state relations are complicated 
by “incommensurable claims”). 
309 I. Berlin, supra note 81, at 171. 
310 Z. Bauman, EUROPE: AN UNFINISHED ADVENTURE 8 (2004). 
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 8-9. 
313 J. Raz, supra note 89, at 345, et seq. See also at 344 (where Raz seems to suggest that 
individuals and communities create values since “truth” sometimes “depends on [presumably 
shared] belief.”  This point is of some significance.  For it may go some way towards explaining 
the determination (and associated emotional intensity) exhibited by some of those who (seek to) 
defend constitutive incommensurables). 
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E.E.C., Harold Wilson argued that “we are not entitled to sell our friends and 
kinsmen down the river for a problematical advantage in selling washing 
machines in Düsseldorf.”314 These words, and others like them, give expression 
to what Hugo Young has called “one of the most potent beliefs of this age.”315 
This is the belief that “the Britain we know is a place whose timeless history has 
composed a nation which now owes to that history a mighty struggle to preserve 
itself against enemies within and without.”316 
The attitude towards Europe that finds expression in the speeches of Gaitskell and 
Wilson is evident in the thinking of Conservative Eurosceptics three decades later.  
By the 1990s, Europe had, as already noted, progressed a significant way towards 
union.  The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 made plain the extent to which movement 
towards union had proceeded.  This Treaty had, on German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl’s analysis, “laid the foundation for the completion of European Union.”317 
314 H. Young, supra note 119, at 157.  See also at 239-240 (emphasis added) (where Young 
discusses Edward Heath’s test for the acceptability of entry into the E.E.C.: “the effect upon the 
standard of living of the individual [British] citizen.”  Young states that “Heath was talking cost of 
living, not cost of nationhood.”  Thus the sort of constitutive incommensurability informing 
Gaitskell’s and Wilson’s thinking was not a feature of  Heath’s thought).  
315 H. Young, SUPPING WITH DEVILS: POLITICAL WRITING FROM THATCHER TO 
BLAIR 98 (2003).  (Among those who regard themselves as having embarked upon the “mighty 
struggle” described by Young, we may number the members of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (U.K.I.P.) (committed to withdrawal from Europe) and those who have joined 
the “Goodbye Brussels” campaign being run by This England (a magazine that styles itself as 
“Britain’s Patriotic Quarterly”).  On U.K.I.P., see H. Young, supra note 119, at 409.  On the 
“Goodbye Brussels” campaign, see This England 66-68 (2005) (Winter edition).) 
316 Id. Among those who regard themselves as having embarked upon the “mighty struggle” 
described by Young, we may number the members of the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(U.K.I.P.) (committed to withdrawal from Europe) and those who have joined the “Goodbye 
Brussels” campaign being run by This England (a magazine that styles itself as “Britain’s Patriotic 
Quarterly”).  On U.K.I.P., see H. Young, supra note 119, at 409.  On the “Goodbye Brussels” 
campaign, see This England 66-68 (2005) (Winter edition).  See also N. Davies, supra note 108, at 
854 (on the widespread tendency among those writing general histories of England (e.g., G.M. 
Trevelyan) to treat their subject as “a discrete community, frozen in time and free as a bird”) and 
at 856 (where G.M. Trevelyan’s HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1952) is described as “no preparation 
for a Britain that … was actively committed to joining [the European Community]”).  Young’s 
observation points up the implausibility of the view that history is static.  For maintaining a 
distinct form of life involves “struggle.”  Part of this struggle is mental.  It involves an effort to 
appreciate, so as to be able to participate in, the relevant values, institutions, and practices.  On this 
type of struggle, see D. Delillo, UNDERWORLD 512 (1998) (where one of the author’s fictive 
characters states: “[y]ou have a history … that you are responsible to.  You’re required to make 
sense of it.  You owe it your complete attention”).  Moreover, this sort of struggle may yield 
unprepossessing insights.  See J. Barnes, ENGLAND, ENGLAND 49 (1988) (where one of the 
characters in this fictional meditation on England’s decline in the Twentieth Century declares: 
“[w]e are no longer mega”). 
317 H. Young, supra note 119, at 389. 
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And it was in reaction to the end-state anticipated by Kohl and others that 
Conservative Eurosceptics made their respective criticisms of union.  Thus we 
find William Cash arguing that the process of integration is a threat to the 
continued existence of Britain as a nation.318 Cash’s argument, and the many 
others like it, exhibit a common feature.  In these arguments, “England,” 
“Britain,” and “the United Kingdom” name a valuable, long enduring, but 
embattled, form of life.  Here, the Conservative Eurosceptics of the 1990s pursue 
a theme that their fellow conservative, Enoch Powell, developed, in lyrical terms, 
three decades earlier.  In a paradigmatic narrative of insularity, Powell invoked 
the memory of those who played a part in fashioning the form of life he sought to 
defend: 
 
Backward travels our gaze ... and there at last we find them ... in many 
a village church ....  From brass and stone, from line and effigy, their 
eyes look out at us, and we gaze into them, as if we would win some 
answer from their inscrutable silence.  “Tell us what it is that binds us 
together; show us the clue that leads through a thousand years, 
whisper to us the secret of this charmed life of England, that we may 
know how to hold it fast.”319 
The answer to the question raised by Powell is continuing and concerted 
commitment to the form of life on which we “gaze.”320 This seems to be the same 
 
318 See W. Cash, AGAINST A FEDERAL EUROPE (1991) and House of Commons, HANSARD, 
10 July 1986, cols 565-566 (where Cash declared (during the third reading of the Bill that saw the 
Single European Act given force on the plane of domestic law) that it was “essential” to “maintain 
the democracy of this House and its sovereignty”).  See also H. Young, supra note 119, at 380 
(noting that “the defence of the nation, as a nation, became his {Cash’s] cause”) and at 394 (noting 
that, before John Major left Britain to participate in the negotiations concerning the Maastricht 
Treaty, Cash told him: “You must … stop what would effectively be a German Europe”).  One 
German proponent of union staked out a position that suggested that Cash’s fears concerning (loss 
of) nationhood had some foundation but that his fears concerning Germany did not.  See Helmut 
Kohl, speech at the University of Louvain, February 2 1996 (stating that “[w]e have no desire to 
return to the nation-state of old.  It cannot solve the great problems of the twenty-first century”). 
319 Speech to the Royal Society of St. George, April 24, 1961: cited in K. Baker, THE FABER 
BOOK OF CONSERVATISM 205 (1993).  Powell stakes out a position that lends strong support 
to the view that a nation’s “biography” is typically fashioned “’up time’ – towards Peking Man, 
Java Man, King Arthur, wherever the lamp of archaeology casts its fitful gleam”.  See, on this 
point, B. Anderson, supra note 284, at 205.   (Powell’s speech contrasts with the less lyrical 
critique of Europe (and narrative of insularity) offered in the 1960s by Derek Walker-Smith who, 
like Powell, was a Conservative Member of Parliament.  He saw Europe as a threat to Britain’s 
survival as an independent state and regarded as “humiliating” the “proposition” that Britain could 
only enjoy economic success by acceding to the E.E.C.  See H. Young, supra note 119, at 154. )  
320 Cf N. Davies, supra note 108, at 874 (arguing that ‘[n]ational communities are held together by 
belief” with the result that, ‘[i]f the belief evaporates, the community disintegrates”).  Whether we 
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sort of commitment described by Cover and by Raz (in his account of constitutive 
incommensurabilities).321 Assuming that this is the case, those who make such a 
commitment will (on the analyses offered by Powell, Cover, and Raz) be able to 
resist the temptation to forget who and what they are.  And, presumably, they 
should, others things being equal, be able to resist the temptation to embrace a 
new form of life and the goods it promises.  But those who fail to make such a 
commitment will (on Raz’s account) exhibit a lack of commitment.322 Indeed, 
they may (from the standpoint of the committed) even be guilty of a species of 
cultural treason.  It is against threats of this sort (a lack of resolve; a weakening of 
commitment; a flight into cultural treason) that Conservative Eurosceptics 
struggled in the 1990s.323 Theirs was a view that left no conceptual space in 
which to embrace Europe while retaining a commitment to their own form of 
life.324 We see this in, for example, the writing of another Conservative Member 
of Parliament, Michael Spicer.  When faced with the looming fact of the 
Maastricht Treaty, he argued that there was no case for working from within 
Europe.325 For, to work within Europe would, necessarily, be to work against 
Britain in ways that would threaten its continued existence.  To the extent that the 
same assumption informs the thinking of other Eurosceptics, the depth of their 
hostility to the project of integration becomes easy to understand.  Europe is 
assumed to be a force that threatens nothing less than the destruction of their 
normative world.326 
talk in terms of “commitment” or “belief,” the point seems to be that communities need more than 
collective intentionality (on which see J.R. Searle, supra note 100) in order to endure.  They also 
need members who are sufficiently motivated (or emotionally engaged) to remain committed to 
them. 
321 See supra notes 89-98, above (and associated text). 
322 See supra note 98 (and associated text). 
323 See H. Young, supra note 119, at 435 (noting that “an independent Britain” was, “in the eyes of 
quite a number of Tory politicians, uncompromisable”).  See also J. Paxman, supra note 160, at 91 
(noting that, for some Eurosceptics, Edward Heath is regarded as “the Traitor-in-Chief”).  See also 
G.P. Fletcher, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 10 and 44 
(1993) (on the English understanding of treason as an “absolute wrong” and on betrayal as a 
failure to reject “tempting alternatives” on “principled” grounds). 
324 Cf J. Raz, supra note 89, 348 (arguing that “significant social forms, which delineate the basic 
shape of projects and relationships which constitute human well-being, depend on a combination 
of incommensurability with a total refusal even to consider exchanging one incommensurate 
option for another”). 
325 M. Spicer, A TREATY TOO FAR: A NEW POLICY FOR EUROPE (1992).  See also H. 
Young, supra note 119, at 391. 
326 To the extent that a given course of action by A makes the destruction of A’s normative 
universe virtually certain, he or she might be said (obliquely) to intend that outcome (even though 
it is not his or her desire, aim, or purpose).  Thus, he or she might be charged (from the point of 
view internal to that world) with (for want of a better term) nomicide: intentional destruction of a 
valuable normative universe.  This may explain why Paxman has found Edward Heath and others 
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The world in question is a nation (the United Kingdom or – in some statements – 
England).  This point merits emphasis.  For we find in the Conservative 
Euroscepticism we have been examining two strands of nationalist thought.  
Enoch Powell’s approach to Europe bespeaks a commitment to an ‘”illiberal” 
form of nationalism.  For he, in common with other illiberal nationalists, 
emphasises the importance of cultural authenticity, integrity, or purity.327 On this 
sort of view, one’s world constitutes an exclusionary reason for action: i.e., a
reason for excluding other reasons for action from consideration (most obviously, 
the eligible options made available in other worlds).328 In these respects, “illiberal 
nationalism” contrasts sharply with “liberal nationalism.”329 Liberal nationalists 
sound a distinctly Coveresque note, by emphasising the importance of “cultural 
narratives.”  On a liberal nationalist view, cultural narratives (at the level of the 
nation) are a precondition of human flourishing.330 For they “provide[ ] the 
spectacles through which we identify experiences as valuable.”331 But those who 
take up this stance do not seek to build a barrier between their world and the 
cultures that lie beyond its limits.  Instead, they are ready to appropriate the fruits 
of other cultures in ways that may work to reshape their own world.332 This is not 
a position that seems to capture the thinking of the Conservative Eurosceptics we 
have considered. 333 
But even liberal nationalists assume that national culture and identity will be 
perdurable.  The plausibility of this assumption is questioned by those who see 
ours as a historical context in which nation-states and the identities they have 
played a part in shaping no longer have sharp definition.334 Relevant here are 
 
being described as traitors.  See supra, note 323. 
327 On “illiberal nationalism,” see W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, 
Multiculturalism, and Citizenship, 211-212 (2001).  
328 On exclusionary reasons for action, see J. Raz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35-48 
(1990). Support for the (exclusionary reason-based) analysis offered in the text is provided by R. 
Scruton, In Defence of the Nation, in THE PHILOSOPHER ON DOVER BEACH 310 (1990) 
(arguing that maintenance of a national community requires “sanctity, intolerance, exclusion”). 
329 W. Kymlicka, supra note 327, at 208-210. 
330 Id. 209-210. 
331 R. Dworkin,, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 228 (1985). 
332 W. Kymlicka, supra note 327, at 211.  See also D. Miller, ON NATIONALISM 140 (1995) 
(arguing that “we must hold on to the principle of nationality, while striving to form national 
identities that can accommodate the pluralism and mutability of contemporary culture”). 
333 See R. Colls, supra note 175, at 153 (arguing that British conservatives place emphasis on the 
values of stability and security, with the result that “they regard[ ] liberals as the principal 
enemy”). 
334 See Z. Bauman, supra note 6, at 3-7, and Z. Bauman, GLOBALISATION: THE HUMAN 
CONSEQUENCES ch. 3 (1998).  See also M. Berman, ALL THAT’S SOLID MELTS INTO 
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Hugo Young’s reactions to Labour’s victory in the 1997 General Election.335 
Young thought that he may be witnessing a revolutionary moment: the 
commitment to nation and sovereignty may be giving way to (or may be about to 
give way to) a new and more flexible world.336 Quite what shape this more 
flexible world would assume was a question that Young (hardly surprisingly) 
could not answer.  Perhaps he saw a new type of politico-legal entity in which 
neither a national nor a supra-national agenda (and associated foundational or 
Grundnorm) was privileged.337 And perhaps he saw this new entity as having 
established a space or zone in which national and supranational constituents of 
identity coalesce.  If Young’s thought did tend in these directions, then, we might 
read him as suggesting a movement, on the part of the British, towards a 
postmodern practical outlook.338 Those who adopt such an outlook do not (unlike 
those who unfold narratives of the sort examined by Cover) see the space they 
inhabit as sharply specified by notions like “community” or “nation.”  Instead, 
they see it as a zone that accommodates a plurality of normative worlds (to which 
labels like “supranational,” “national,” and “regional” may, at most, be applied 
with great hesitancy).339 Moreover, while these worlds (and their associated 
narratives) may play a part in shaping individual identity, that identity (assuming 
it even exists) is typically identified by postmodernists as being in a state of 
 
AIR: THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY ch. 2 (1982). 
335 See ns 202-203, above, and associated text. 
336 Some argue that the “more flexible world” contemplated by Young, in fact, exists.  See J. 
Habermas, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION 99 (2001), N. MacCormick, Beyond the 
Sovereign State 56 MODERN L. REV. 1, at 5-10 and at 16 (1993), J. Shaw, Process and 
Constitutional Discourse in the European Union 27 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 4, at 
19-25 (2000), and I. Ward, supra note 283. And some argue that the sort of flexibility 
MacCormick and others associate with the European project of integration has been associated, for 
centuries, with Europe not as a politico-legal entity but as a cultural ideal.  See Z. Bauman, supra 
note 310, at 6 (on Europe’s “free-floating” essence).  
337 Cf J.H.H. Weiler, A Constitution for Europe?  Some Hard Choices, 40 JOURNAL OF 
COMMON MARKET STUDIES 563 (2002) (arguing that the European Union has established a 
delicate balance between the national and E.U.-based sources of constitutionalism). See also J. 
Shaw, supra note 5, at 141 (noting that Weiler’s view is hard to reconcile with the supremacy 
principle). The idea of a Grundnorm (or foundational norm) is elaborated in the positivist legal 
philosophy of Hans Kelsen.  Kelsen argued that systems of law presuppose the existence of a 
foundational norm that, inter alia, makes intersubjective normative judgment possible.  See H. 
Kelsen, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-195 (1967).  See also at 286-287 (on “the identity of 
state and law” and the state as a “social community”). 
338 Numerous commentators have theorised relations between the E.U. and it member-states and 
citizens in postmodern terms.  See, for example, See J. Gray, ENDGAMES: QUESTIONS IN 
LATE-MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 180 (1997) (contemplating the possibility that 
“European institutions can develop into a postmodern state”).  See also Z. Bankowski and E. 
Christodoulidis, The European Union as an Essentially Contested Project, 4 EUROPEAN LAW 
JOURNAL 341 (1998). 
339 M. Bradbury, supra note 271, at 480. 
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flux.340 And the upshot, on one analysis, is “a “postmodern attitude” that finds 
expression in “a mixture of world weariness and cleverness.”341 
Let us assume that this attitude finds expression in a world weary refusal to 
embrace British narratives of insularity.  And let us assume that it also finds 
expression in a readiness to subject the E.U.’s narrative of redemption to informed 
and incisive (i.e., clever) critique.342 If these (admittedly, rather large) 
assumptions are well founded, then Young may indeed be alerting us to the 
emergence of a postmodern practical outlook.  But to say these things is perhaps 
to read too much into his analysis.  He may simply be making the point that, with 
the passage of time, our self-understandings alter and assume new shapes that are 
assumed to be perdurable.343 This is certainly a point borne out by the history of 
Britain.344 And, assuming that it remains true in the future, Europe’s redemptive 
narrative may, over time, significantly reshape the self-understanding of the 
British.  Or it may name a force that prompts them to rework an old narrative of 
insularity – one that runs on the themes of sovereignty and independence.  In the 
ambiguous normative space the British now inhabit, the shape that their world and 
its associated narrative will assume is a matter on which we can only speculate.  
 
Conclusions 
 
While Cover’s Nomos and Narrative focuses on relationships between 
communities in a system of municipal law, the argument advanced in this essay 
supports the conclusion that his analysis has relevance to U.K.-E.U. relations.  
The support for this conclusion takes the form of an analogical argument.  The 
 
340 Id. See also T. Eagleton, THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM 88 (1996) (noting that, 
on a postmodern view, the “subject” is “constituted to its core by a diffuse set of forces”), and R. 
Ruland and M. Bradbury, FROM PURITANISM TO POSTMODERNISM: A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LITERATURE 370-372 (1991) (arguing that, in postmodern culture, “[t]he only 
reality that can be known is a contingent synthesis rescued by sheer force of human will from a 
Heraclitean ocean of flux”). 
341 B. McHale, CONSTRUCTING POSTMODERNISM 39 (1992). 
342 Making the assumptions outlined in the text seems apt since, on one much-quoted analysis, a 
refusal to embrace grand narratives is a defining feature of postmodernism.  See J.-F. Lyotard, 
THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE xxiv (1979).  (Lyotard’s 
analysis has particular relevance to the narrative of redemption associated with the project of 
European integration.  For this project is informed by ideals that have their roots in the 
Enlightenment (see supra note 106).  And the Enlightenment (with its emphasis on reason as the 
means by which to secure peace and other goods) provides, on Lyotard’s account, a paradigmatic 
example of a grand narrative.)   
343 See B. Barry, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF 
MULTICULTURALISM 74-75 (2002). 
344 N. Davies, supra note 108, at 876 (on “historical change” in British identity). 
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religious communities described by Cover seek to maintain a distinct identity in 
the face of the threat posed by the secular national community.  Likewise, the 
United Kingdom’s political leaders have sought, inter alia, to maintain a distinct 
identity in the face of the threat they see the E.U. as posing.  In each case, 
relations between the relevant communities are fraught with tension.  In the 
relationships described by Cover and in U.K.-E.U. relations, the larger 
community identifies itself as working to secure the interests of the smaller 
community (or communities).  But, at the same time, the larger community 
invokes (so as to legitimate its actions) a redemptive narrative that threatens to 
undermine the integrity of the smaller community (or communities).  Thus, 
ambivalence arises in some of those situated at the local level.  This ambivalence 
finds expression in, inter alia, debates as to the amount of normative space that 
each of the communities ought to occupy.  Debates of this sort concern more than 
mere technicalities.  In the smaller community, the defence of normative space 
(and the institutions, practices, and values that invest it with significance) has to 
do with sustaining a particular identity and worldview.  But, such a defence may 
be attended by significant loss.  To the extent that those leading the process of 
integration are antagonised, opportunities (indeed, a viable future) may melt 
away.  Where this is the case, a conflicted – perhaps even aporetic - outlook of the 
sort detected in Harold Macmillan becomes easy to understand. 
 
While Europe may inspire ambivalence in some British politicians, in others it 
gives rise to hostility.  We see such hostility in, for example, Michael Spicer’s 
arguments against British participation in the process of integration.  On the sort 
of view put forward by Spicer, there is no room for compromise with Europe.  If 
Britain is to endure, the process of integration must be rejected.  On this view, 
one’s world – or, more particularly, its defence – becomes an exclusionary reason 
for action: a reason for rejecting Europe and the opportunities it opens up.  
Moreover, we can press this analysis further.  The implacable opposition to 
Europe demonstrated by Spicer and others suggests a friend-versus-foe approach 
to politics of the sort described in the writings of Carl Schmitt.  On Schmitt’s 
view, politics involves struggle between “friends” and “foes.”345 And, so acute is 
this struggle, that (on the Schmittian view) political opponents ultimately 
contemplate extirpating one another.  Now, Spicer and others who have staked out 
the same sort of position are certainly not calling for the extirpation of the 
 
345 C. Schmitt, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (1976).  See also R. Scruton, supra note 
328, at 310 (arguing that maintenance of a national community requires “vigilance against the 
enemy”).  (While the pluralistic thrust of Cover’s argument in Nomos and Narrative leads him to 
sound few Schmittian sounding notes, one should be noted: when “[l]et loose”, nomoi may 
become “sectarian in their social organisation, dissociative … in their discourse, wary and violent 
in their interactions.”  See R.M. Cover supra note 1, at 16.). 
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European foe.  But they do see Europe (the process of integration and associated 
institutions) as the enemy of their form of life.  For theirs are arguments informed 
by the assumption that “the Community [is] a place of British failure.”346 And 
failure, here, means loss (quite possibly over a protracted period of time) of their 
form of life.  But, on their analysis, any such failure is avoidable.  To avoid it, the 
British must remain committed to the nomos (and associated narrative) that 
invests their collective life with meaning.  And, here, we find strong support for 
Cover’s argument that a nomos is sustained by commitment on the part of those 
who live within it.347 
The analysis offered in this essay speaks to the sources of tension we have been 
considering in a number of specific ways.  If we want to understand how such 
tension arises, Raz’s concept of constitutive incommensurability seems helpful.  
For Raz points up the association between maintenance of particular values and 
“commitment” or “loyalty.”348 This has clear relevance to those British 
Eurosceptics who see their task as nothing less than the defence of a world that 
invests their lives with meaning.  And, where constitutive incommensurability 
exists at the level of the member-state, we might expect it to find expression in 
narratives of insularity.  For these narratives run on the theme of continuing 
commitment or loyalty to the relevant community’s cause.  And this is precisely 
what we do find in, for example, the responses to Europe made by, inter alios,
Gaitskell, Powell, and the Tory Eurosceptics of the 1990s.  Moreover, in at least 
some cases, these narratives have a distinctly monologic look.  This is certainly 
true of Powell and Spicer, who see unwavering commitment to the national cause 
as the only way in which to guarantee its continued existence.   
 
Where views of this sort are met with a European monologue of integration, we 
might see ourselves as faced with the state of affairs to which Michel Foucault 
gave the name “heterotopia.”349 On Foucault’s account, a heterotopia exists in 
 
346 H. Young, supra note 119, at 3. 
347 A statement by the E.U. Commissioner charged with the task of winning support for the ill-
starred Constitutional Treaty suggests that the Schmittian view of politics has some relevance to 
U.K.-E.U. relations.  See J. Stares, U.K. Hatred of E.U. Is Our Biggest Challenge, Says 
Constitution Commissioner, THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, February 20 2005, 32 (where Margot 
Wallström states that “[t]he U.K. is filled with hatred towards the E.U. institutions”). 
348 See supra note 98 (and associated text). 
349 M. Foucault, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN 
SCIENCES xviii (1970).    (Foucault appears to have first set out the idea of a heterotopia in a 
lecture.  This lecture has subsequently been published in M. Foucault, DES ESPACE AUTRES 4 
(1984) (arguing that a heterotopia is “capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, 
several sites that are in themselves incompatible”). This record of Foucault’s lecture can be 
accessed at: http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html. While the 
point cannot be examined in detail here, Foucault’s account of a heterotopia bears family 
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circumstances where worlds sit alongside one another, but those who make up 
their respective populations cannot enter into dialogue with one another.350 This 
is surely too bleak an analysis to apply to relations between the E.U. and the U.K.  
An unlikely sounding source provides the basis for a more plausible alternative.  
This is Laurence Sterne’s novel, Tristram Shandy, which famously foregrounds 
the difficulties involved in sustaining a distinct narrative.351 The characters who 
populate this fictive world are actuated by particular, and sometimes mutually 
incompatible, enthusiasms.  These enthusiasms are, on Sterne’s account, “hobby-
horses” to which they are strongly committed.352 This commitment finds 
expression in what he calls a “scampering discourse.”353 The participants in such 
a discourse meet others’ views not with attentive responses but, rather, with an 
account of their own enthusiasms.  These non-responses are not a function of 
cognitive impairment.  People can be attentive to others.  But their enthusiasms 
are apt to blind them to anything other than their own commitments.  Sterne thus 
alerts us to some contingencies that commonly make practical life awkward: 
preoccupation with particular things or states of affairs and (consequent) 
inattention to others’ commitments.  
 
These contingencies have clear relevance to E.U.-U.K. relations.  We often see 
the proponents of integration (e.g., Monnet, Tindemans, Juncker) and their British 
critics (e.g., Powell, Cash, Spicer) astride their respective hobby-horses.354 But 
we should not exaggerate the difficulties to which the contingencies described by 
Sterne give rise.  Eurosceptics – as the example of Gaitskell makes clear – can 
grasp the benefits that may flow from a Europe that they, at the same time, see as 
 
resemblances to “the myth of the framework”, as critiqued in K. Popper, supra note 75.)   
350 Id.  Foucault explains the failure of communication he describes by reference to the concept of 
incommensurability.  But, in the situation we are contemplating, uncombinability would provide a 
better explanation for failures to communicate.  This is because each of the narratives we are 
considering gives priority to its own practical agenda (be it European integration or continued 
British independence).  Cf B. Williams, supra note 306 (on uncombinability and dialogue).  
351 L. Sterne, THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF TRISTRAM SHANDY, GENTLEMAN (1912).  
352 Id. at 10 and at 13.  See also at 261 (on the commonly encountered tendency of people to 
“harangue” one another). 
353 Id. 136.   
354 While the matter cannot be pursued in detail here, the problems associated with scampering 
discourse often arise in circumstances where the proponents of European integration seek to plan 
for a shared future.  For example, in 2000, both French President Jacques Chirac and German 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer endorsed the view that their countries should lead an 
(integration-focused) “pioneer group” in Europe.  But, while, Fischer argued for a federal future, 
Chirac argued for a Directoire (a developed form of intergovernmentalism controlled by Europe’s 
largest states).  See C. Booker and R. North, supra note 111, at 376-384.  (See also J. Shaw, supra 
note 336, at 19-24 (arguing that success in fostering a vigorous “continuing conversation” 
provides an appropriate criterion for assessing Europe’s claims to offer a legitimate form of  “post-
national constitutionalism”).  See also I. Ward, supra note 4, at 274.) 
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a threat.  And integrationists can grasp – as did the framers of the Constitutional 
Treaty – that forms of life at member-state level are significant sources of value, 
meaning, and identity.  This being so, there is at least the possibility (perhaps a 
rather remote one) that a scampering discourse may turn into something more 
edifying.  A further reason for taking this optimistic view can be found in Raz’s 
account of constitutive incommensurabilities.  As we have noted, Raz argues that 
these incommensurabilities arise through (continuing) acts of commitment.  
Where this is the case, a constitutive incommensurability does not preclude 
dialogue.  For its existence is contingent: it depends on continuing commitment 
from those who have authored it or who seek to sustain it.  This being so, there 
seems to be no necessary (ontological) barrier to the adoption of other 
commitments that dissolve sources of tension between particular values and the 
worlds they sustain.   
 
Even if we take this optimistic view, we must still face the difficult question as to 
how relations between the E.U. and the U.K. (and other member-states) should be 
organised.  Walzer’s communitarian political philosophy is helpful here.  He 
argues that we should treat the bearers of particular cultures with respect.  To this 
end, we should be alive to the threat that the project of integration poses to 
particular cultures and traditions.  This is a matter to which Cover speaks by 
arguing that nomoi (at least, presumptively) merit “respect,” “autonomy,” and 
“toleration.”355 In the E.U. context, Joseph Weiler has recently put forward a 
broadly similar argument.  Weiler argues that relations between the E.U. and 
member-states should be seen as being mediated by a tolerance principle.356 This 
principle enjoins those at both the supranational and national levels to be attentive 
to, and to seek to accommodate, the views of those at the other level.357 Thus, 
where acted upon, this principle would (other things being equal) counter the 
threat of monologue and the sort of scampering discourse to which it may give 
rise. 
 
But, while the tolerance principle (in common with Cover’s arguments) enjoins 
adoption of an attractive disposition, it does not provide a solution to many of the 
practical problems with which Europe and its member-states must grapple.  
Tolerance will not eliminate differences of perspective.  Thus, Europe must, if it 
is to engage with its citizens, forswear the sort of delusive belief in unity criticised 
by Bakhtin in his account of monologism.358 Moreover, just as tolerance will not 
 
355 See supra note 35 (and associated text). 
356 J. Weiler, In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg, in J.H.H. Weiler 
and M. Wind, EUROPEAN CONSTITUIONALISM: BEYOND THE STATE 7-26 (2003). 
357 Id. 
358 See supra, notes 57-65 (and associated text). 
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eliminate differences in perspective, neither will it eliminate problems of 
incommensurability and uncombinability.  Berlin speaks to these problems in 
terms that will have appeal to the critics of European integration.  He argues that 
one response to the problem of choice between incommensurables is to embrace 
the option that least obstructs the common life of a particular community.  
Moreover, he stakes out the same position with respect to uncombinables.359 
Hence, Berlin’s analysis supports the conclusion that particular societies should 
be allowed to establish, for example, bodies of labour law that accommodate 
incommensurable and/or uncombinable values in ways that are attuned to their 
respective forms of life.360 
To the problems so far considered one more must be added (which, again, has to 
do with incommensurability and uncombinability).  Arguments for “respect,” 
“toleration,” etc., are often informed by a composite philosophical position to 
which the name “qualified deontology” can be given.  Those who adopt this sort 
of position give priority to the deontological assumption that certain values and 
states of affairs have intrinsic worth and, therefore, ought to be respected.361 But 
this deontological assumption is qualified by a consequentialist impulse.362 
Arguments in support of the view that a certain value or state of affairs should not 
be compromised can be overridden where there are powerful consequential 
reasons for doing so.363 The relevance of this philosophical position to arguments 
for respect, etc., is easily explained.  Those who advance these arguments assume 
that particular cultures should be left to their own devices unless there are clear 
and substantial benefits to be gained from interfering with them.   
 
But arguments of this sort collide with those advanced by the proponents of 
integration.  For the arguments of the latter appear to be informed by a 
significantly different composite political philosophy.  This latter political 
philosophy is qualified consequentialism, and it gives priority to the pursuit of 
generally beneficial outcomes: e.g., the maintenance of peace and the generation 
 
359 See supra note 88 (and associated text). 
360 Berlin’s brand of pluralism would support the adoption of a range of labour law-related 
positions between the extremes that featured in, for example, Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech 
(on the one hand, a one-size-fits-all commitment to social protection (that works to undermine 
competitiveness) and, on the other, a flexibilised labour market in which only minimal levels of 
protection are extended to workers).  
361 See R. Mullender, Theorising the Third Way: Qualified Consequentialism, the Proportionality 
Principle, and the New Social Democracy, 27 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 493, 510-
511 (2000). 
362 Id.
363 Id. at 512. 
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of wealth through market mechanisms.364 The privileged consequentialist 
component in this philosophy is, however, qualified by a deontological impulse.  
Values and states of affairs that have intrinsic worth should only be compromised 
where this is necessary in order effectively to pursue a generally beneficial 
outcome.365 The two elements of this composite position have clear relevance to 
Europe and the project of integration.  Since, the publication of the Schuman Plan, 
those who have sought to advance the agenda of integration have identified 
themselves as pursuing generally beneficial outcomes: e.g., peace, economic 
prosperity, and ultimately the “construction of Europe.”366 But, while the 
practical thought of those pursuing integration is strongly consequentialist, it also 
exhibits some sensitivity to the assumption that “national identity,” “culture,” etc., 
are sources of intrinsic value.  And this has led them to temper pursuit of the 
generally beneficial outcomes to which they attach priority.  Nonetheless, the fact 
remains that they give priority to the project of integration.  And they believe that 
they can adduce strong arguments in favour of pursuing this project.  Thus, the 
two composite moral positions outlined here (qualified deontology and qualified 
consequentialism) come into collision with one another.  As a result, acute 
tensions arise.  This is because the components common to the two positions we 
are considering (consequentialism and deontology) yield incommensurable 
arguments. This would be the case where, for example, pursuit of the benefits 
yielded by trade between member-states would, other things being equal, threaten 
the integrity of distinct forms of national life.  In such circumstances, no metric or 
overarching value would be available to identify one of the two considerations as 
more significant than the other.  Hence, judgments have to be made as to how the 
relevant arguments should be sequenced: should either consequentialism or 
deontology be given priority as a reason for action?367 Likewise, judgments have 
 
364 As used in the text, a “generally beneficial outcome” is produced in circumstances where the 
interests of all affected parties are advanced.  While the point cannot be developed in detail here, it 
should be noted that pursuit of a generally beneficial outcome bears similarities to the pursuit of 
mutual expected advantage.  Proponents of mutual expected advantage argue that practical 
arrangements are defensible where they redound to the benefit of all affected parties.  See G.J. 
Postema, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 108 (1986) (discussing David 
Hume’s arguments for pursuit of mutual expected advantage).   
365 R. Mullender, supra note 361, at 500-501.  See also at 503-510 (discussing the proportionality 
principle as a means by which to mediate the consequentialist and deontological impulses in 
qualified consequentialism.  Proportionality is a principle that is regularly used by the E.C.J.  See, 
for example, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] E.C.R. 1125, at 1146, per Attorney-
General Dutheillet de Lamothe). 
366 See I. Ward, supra note 4, at 42-4 (discussing, inter alia, Article B of the Maastricht Treaty, 
which identified “economic and social progress” as aims of the European Union), and at 257 
(discussing “the ends-oriented politics which today’s Europe champions”). See also the 
Tindemans Report, supra note 133 (on the “construction of Europe”). 
367 On sequencing of the sort described in the text, see B. Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and 
60 Symposium: Robert M. Cover: Nomos and Narrative [2006], Article 3
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss8/art3
to be made as to when the privileged moral impulse should yield to the relevant 
counter-impulse.  Those who make these judgments are necessarily attentive to 
concerns that their opponents (either at the supranational or member-state-level) 
prioritise.  But even where the proponents of integration and the defenders of 
national identity are attentive to the (incommensurable) views of their opponents, 
they must wrestle with a further uncombinability problem.  For integration and 
national identity, etc., cannot be simultaneously prioritised.  In these 
circumstances, efforts to pursue harmony are doomed to failure.  This is 
something to which the integrationist narrative of redemption and British 
narratives of insularity powerfully attest.  And it is a state of affairs that would not 
come as a surprise to Robert Cover.   
 
Conceptually Sequenced Argument, 146 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA L. REV. 1487 
(1998). 
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